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ANNEX 1 SUMMARY INFORMATION 
IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARY 
 Electricity Gas 
 
Market  
opening 
size of 
open 
market TWh 
 
eligibility 
threshold 
unbundling 
Market 
opening 
size of open 
market bcm 
eligibility 
threshold 
unbundling 
    TSO DSOs    TSO DSOs 
Austria 100% 55 - leg. leg. 100% 7 - leg. leg. 
Belgium c.90% 60 1 leg. leg. c.90% 11 1 leg. leg. 
Denmark 100% 33 - leg. leg. 100% 5 - own. leg. 
Finland 100% 80 - own. acc.      
France 70% 275 non HH leg. man. 70% 28 non HH leg. acc. 
Germany 100% 500 - leg. acc. 100% 82 - acc.2 acc. 
Greece 62% 29 non HH3 leg. none      
Ireland 56% 12 1GWh leg. man. 86% 3 0.5 mcm man. man. 
Italy 79% 225 non HH own. leg. 100% 62 - leg. leg. 
Luxembourg 57% 3 20GWh man. man. 72% 1 15mcm man. man. 
Netherlands 100% 100 -  own. leg. 100% 38 - leg. leg. 
Portugal 100% 42 - own. acc.      
Spain 100% 210 - own. leg. 100% 20 - leg. leg. 
Sweden 100% 135 - own leg. 50%4 1 15mcm acc. acc. 
UK 5 100% 335 - own. leg. 100% 95 - own. own. 
Norway 100% 110 - own. leg.\acc.      
Estonia 10% 1 40 GWh leg. leg. 95% 1 non HH acc. acc. 
Latvia 76% 4 non HH acc. acc. 0% 0 - acc. acc. 
Lithuania n.k.  n.k. leg. leg. 70% 2 1mcm acc. acc. 
Poland 52% 50 1 GWh leg. acc. 34% 4 15mcm leg. acc. 
Czech R 47% 25 6 leg. acc. 0% 0 - none. none. 
Slovakia 66% 15 non HH leg. man. 34% 2 15mcm man. man. 
Hungary 67% 22 non HH leg. acc. 69% 8 non HH leg. acc. 
Slovenia 75% 10 non HH leg. acc. 91% 1 non HH leg. acc. 
Cyprus 35% 1 350MWh man. none  
Malta 0% 0 n.a.  7  
                                                 
1 Full market opening in the Flanders region. non households (non HH) in other regions 
2 some legal unbundling on a voluntary basis  
3 All customers in non-interconnected islands are non-eligible 
4 95% from 1 Jan 2005, all non-households  
5 In Northern Ireland, the electricity market is open to non-households.  
6 if hourly metered 
7 single buyer model 
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 Electricity Gas 
 
Market  
opening 
size of 
open 
market TWh 
 
eligibility 
threshold 
unbundling 
Market 
opening 
size of open 
market bcm 
eligibility 
threshold 
unbundling 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 33% 25 40GWh leg. man. 40% 5 3mcm leg. acc. 
Bulgaria 22% 5 40GWh acc. acc. 82% 2 20mcm8 acc. acc. 
Turkey 29% 30 7.8GWh leg. acc. 80% 12 1mcm leg. leg. 
Croatia 0% 0 - none none      
Other Neighbouring Countries 
Bosnia 0% 0 - none none      
Serbia\Mont. 0% 0 - none none      
FYROM 18%  100KV none none      
Albania 8%  50GWh leg. man.      
source: Information provided by Regulators\Member States 
                                                 
8 and all CHP producers and generators 
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PRICE COMPARISONS 
Graph 1 End-user Electricity Price Comparison: July 2004 
9
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Graph 2 End-User Gas Prices Comparison: July 2004 
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Source: Eurostat 
                                                 
9
 “Large”: average Eurostat price for Ie and Ig standard consumers. “Small”: average Eurostat price for 
Ib, Dc and Dd standard consumers. Prices are reported net of all taxes. 
 Prices for Germany include municipal charges for rights of way. 
10
 “Large”: average Eurostat price for I4 and I3 standard consumers. “Small”: average Eurostat price for 
I1, D3 and D2 standard consumers. Prices are reported net of all taxes. 
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SWITCHING ESTIMATES: ELECTRICITY 
 Large eligible industrial users
11
 Small commercial/ Domestic 
 since market 
opening 
during 2003 since market 
opening 
during 2003 
Austria 22%12 7% 3% 1% 
Belgium 35% 8% 19%13 19% 
Denmark > 50% 22% 5% 5% 
Finland > 50% 16% n.k. 4% 
France 22% n.k.   
Germany 35%14 n.k. 6%15 n.k. 
Greece 0% 0%   
Ireland >50% 6% 1% 1% 
Italy c. 15% n.k.   
Luxembourg 10% n.k.   
Netherlands 30% n.k. 35% n.k. 
Portugal 9%16 7% 1% 1% 
Spain 18% 5% 0%17 0% 
Sweden >50% 5% n.k. 10% 
UK >50% n.k. >50% 22% 
Norway >50% 15% >50% 19% 
Estonia 0% 0%   
Latvia 0% 0%   
Lithuania 17% 17%   
Poland 10% 7%   
Czech R n.k. n.k.   
Slovakia 10% 3% 4% n.k. 
Hungary 24% 19%   
Slovenia 10% 10%   
Cyprus 0% 0%   
Malta 0% 0%   
Candidate Countries 
Romania 24% 13%   
Bulgaria 0%18 0%   
Turkey 2% 2%   
Croatia 0% n.k.   
Other Neighbouring Countries 
Bosnia 0% 0%   
Serbia\Mont. 0% 0%   
FYROM 0% 0%   
Albania 0% 0%   
source: Information provided by Regulators.  
 
                                                 
11
 in general this refers to clients consuming more than 1GWh/year 
12
 100% have renegotiated with their existing supplier 
13
 Flanders region only 
14
 The remaining approximately 65% have renegotiated with their existing supplier 
15
 A further approximately 25-50% have renegotiated with their existing supplier 
16
 Corresponds to 19% of high voltage customers’ consumption 
17
 Approximately 18% have renegotiated with their existing supplier 
18
 2-3 large customers have changed supplier during 2004 
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 SWITCHING ESTIMATES: GAS 
 Large eligible industrial users Small commercial/ Domestic 
 since market 
opening 
during 2003 since market 
opening 
during 2003 
Austria 9% 9% 0.5% 0.5% 
Belgium
19
 60% n.a. 4% 4% 
Denmark 30% 3% 
20
  
France 25% 5%   
Germany 7% n.k. <2% 0% 
Ireland >50% 1%   
Italy 30% n.k. 35% 35% 
Luxembourg <5% n.k.   
Netherlands c.30% n.k. 2% n.k. 
Spain >50% 22% 5% 5% 
Sweden n.k. n.k.   
UK >50% 19% 47% 13% 
Estonia 20% 0%   
Latvia 0% 0%   
Lithuania 0% 0%   
Poland 0% 0%   
Czech R 0% 0%   
Slovakia 0% 0%   
Hungary 5% 5%   
Slovenia 0% 0%   
Candidate Countries 
Croatia 0% 0%   
Romania >50% >50%   
Bulgaria 0% 0%   
Turkey n.k. n.k.   
source: Information provided by Regulators.  
 
                                                 
19
 Large users: Flanders 90%, Wallonie 40%, Small users: Flanders only 
20
 around 3% of small commercial customers have changed supplier during 2004 
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PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENTS IN THE UTILITY SECTOR  
Annual labour productivity growth electricity gas and water supply (% per annum 
1990-2001, EU15 countries) 
 
 1990-95 1995-2001 
Austria 3.5 3.5 
Belgium 4.4 6.3 
Denmark 5.4 n.k. 
Finland 7.9 5.4 
France 2.2 3.6 
Germany 3.5 6.2 
Greece 2.0 5.5 
Ireland 18.2 7.9 
Italy 3.2 3.6 
Luxembourg 5.2 5.4 
Netherlands 1.9 4.5 
Portugal 8.7 14.4 
Spain 1.7 5.5 
Sweden 1.6 0.6 
UK 5.2 10.4 
source: DG ENTR report
21
 
 
                                                 
21
 EU productivity and competitiveness: An industry perspective  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/library/lib-competitiveness/series_competitiveness.htm 
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PRESENCE OF LARGEST COMPANIES IN SELECTED INDIVIDUAL MEMBER 
STATES 
 
 Electricity  Gas  
Company LARGEST OTHER SIGNIFICANT largest OTHER SIGNIFICANT 
Austria VERBUND RWE, EON, EDF OMV  GDF, RWE  
Belgium E-BEL EDF, ESSENT, NUON, CENTRICA DISTRIGAS ESSENT, NUON, CENTRICA 
Denmark ELSAM E2, VF, EON DONG  
Finland FORTUM VF, EON GASUM  
France EDF E-BEL, ENDESA GDF TOTAL 
Germany RWE EON, VF, EDF EON WINGAS, RWE, EXXON, SHELL 
Greece PPC  DEPA  
Ireland ESB NIE (Viridian) BGE RWE 
Italy ENEL E-BEL, ENDESA, EDISON, VERBUND ENI EDISON 
Netherlands E-BEL ESSENT, NUON, EON SHELL EXXON 
Portugal EDP ENDESA GDP  
Spain ENDESA IBERDROLA, EDP, ENEL, UNION FENOSA GAS. NAT BP , IBERDROLA, CEPSA  
Sweden VF EON, FORTUM EON DONG,  
UK   EDF , EON, RWE, CENTRICA CENTRICA SHELL, EXXON, BP, EON, EDF, RWE 
Poland BOT PKE, PAK, E-BEL, EDF PGNIG  
Czech R CEZ RWE, EON RWE EON 
Slovakia ENEL TEKO, RWE, EDF, EON SPP (GDF, EON)  
Hungary MVM EDF, EON, RWE MOL GDF, RWE, EON, ENI 
Slovenia HSE  GEOPLIN  
source: DG TREN estimates 
 EN 9   EN 
ANNEX 2 Unbundling and Network Access: Electricity 
Background 
Fair network access conditions are crucial for the development of a competitive market. This 
refers to both the use of physical network access as well as for ancillary services such as the 
provision of balancing energy. In order to ensure this, the new Directives require regulation of 
the methodologies used to set charges for these services and the legal and functional 
unbundling of both transmission and distribution networks operators. 
Unbundling 
Table 2.1 below shows the latest position for the unbundling of the electricity network 
businesses.  
Table 2.1 Unbundling of Network Operators: Electricity
22
 
Basic 
unbundling 
model 
Published 
accounts 
Compliance 
officer23 
 
Separate 
corporate 
identity 
Separate 
locations  
 
 
TSO DSO TSO DSO TSO DSO TSO DSO TSO DSO 
Total 
Yes 
Austria L L Y Y  Y Y Y N Y N 6 
Belgium L L
24
 Y Y Y Y
25
 Y Y Y Y
24
 7 
Denmark L L Y Y Y Y Y N Y N 6 
Finland O A Y Y Y N Y N Y large 5½ 
France L M Y N Y Y Y N Y N 5 
Germany L A Y Y Y N Y N Y partly 5½ 
Greece L N N N N N Y N N N 1 
Ireland L/M M Y Y N Y Y Y Y N 6 
Italy O L Y Y Y Y Y N Y N 6 
Lux M M Y Y N N N N N N 2 
Neth O L Y Y Y Y Y N Y N 6 
Portugal O A Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 7 
Spain O L Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N 7 
Sweden O L Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y 7 
UK O L Y Y Y Y Y often Y Y 7½ 
Norway O L/A Y Y Y N Y N Y N 5 
Estonia L L Y Y Y Y N N Y N 5 
Latvia A A Y Y Y Y N N Y Y 6 
Lithuania L L Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y 7 
Poland L A Y N N N Y N Y N 3 
Czech R L A Y Y N N Y Y Y N 5 
Slovakia L M Y Y N N Y N Y ? 4 
Hungary L A Y Y N N Y N Y N 4 
Slovenia L A Y Y N N Y N Y N 4 
Cyprus M N Y N Y Y N N N N 3 
Malta  A  Y  N  N  N 1 
                                                 
22
 Ownership, Legal, Management, Accounts. L/M means system operator is legally unbundled, system 
owner management unbundled 
23
 If ownership unbundled, automatically set to “Y”  
24
 Brussels region not yet legally unbundled 
25
 not in Flanders region 
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Candidate Countries 
Romania L M Y Y Y N Y N Y Y 6 
Bulgaria A A Y Y Y Y N N N N 4 
Turkey L A Y Y N N Y N Y N 4 
Croatia N N N n.k. N n.k. N n.k. N n.k. 0 
Other Neighbouring Countries 
Bosnia N N N n.k. N n.k. N n.k. N n.k. 0 
Serb\Mont. N N N N N N N N N N 0 
FYROM N N N n.k. N n.k. N n.k. N n.k. 0 
Albania L M Y Y Y N Y N Y N 5 
source: Regulators 
 
These show that, for the transmission system, almost all Member States are compliant with 
the requirements of the Directive. There is also a relatively high degree of management 
unbundling of these companies in terms of the four indicators chosen. 
Other than for their accounts, distribution system operators do not need to be unbundled until 
2007 and a number of Member States have not yet taken this step. In addition, for most 
Member States distribution would appear to be still integrated with the supply businesses in 
management terms and these are still organised by municipal government agencies. Only a 
few have a separate corporate identity or location.  
Network Access 
Strict rules on unbundling are required to ensure that network access charges are cost 
reflective and do not contain hidden cross subsidies. A key task of regulators is, therefore; too 
ensure that network operators do not earn excessive profits. Otherwise this may enable, for 
example, vertically integrated companies to run their affiliated supply business at a loss and 
allow predatory pricing. Regulators also need to ensure appropriate cost allocation on shared 
services and that tariff structures are non-discriminatory and apply equally to all network 
users, including affiliated and non-affiliated suppliers. 
Table 2.2 below provides the latest available information from regulators on network tariffs 
currently being paid by a range of customers. These still show a significant degree of 
divergence, particularly for small commercial customers and households, which will be 
mainly reflective of differences in distribution charges. Some Member States appear to have 
network tariffs significantly above the average and the reason for this should be closely 
examined by regulators in their approval of tariff methodologies.  
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Table 2.2  Network Access: Electricity
26
 
   Medium 
Voltage  
Low  
Voltage 
 Number of 
transmission 
companies 
Number of 
distribution 
companies 
Estimated 
average 
total charge  
Eurostat Ig 
(€/MWh)  
Estimated 
average 
total charge 
Eurostat Ib 
(€/MWh)  
Estimated 
average total 
charge 
Eurostat Dc 
(€/MWh) 
Austria 3 133 11 56 61 
Belgium 1 27 14 50 58 
Denmark 2 125 n.a. 23 42 
Finland 1 104 16 32 40 
France 1 166 12 40 48 
Germany 4 950 9 55 62 
Greece 1 1 Not available 
Ireland 1 1 17 44 50 
Italy 1 170 11 52 36 
Luxembourg 2 11 Not available 
Netherlands 1 20 11 31 36 
Portugal 1 11 6 42 38 
Spain 1 308 7 36 35 
Sweden
27
 1 180 11 22 44 
UK 2
28
 15 15 35 30 
Norway 1 150 13 27 30
29
 
Estonia 1 17 - - - 
Latvia 1 7 18 42 38 
Lithuania 1 7 Not available 
Poland 1 21 13 34 27 
Czech Rep 1 360 12 32 32 
Slovakia 1 3 22 33 32 
Hungary 1 6 9 30 40 
Slovenia 1 5 10 45 29 
Cyprus 1 1 
Malta 0 1 
Not available 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 1 8 10 18 18 
Bulgaria 1 9 6 11 26 
Turkey 1 9 10 11 11 
Croatia 1 1 Not available 
Other Neighbouring Countries 
Bosnia 3 4 
Serb\Mont. 1 27 
FYROM 1 1 
Albania 1 1 
 
not covered in this report 
 
source: Regulators, DG Tren Analysis 
 
                                                 
26
 Charges are estimated excluding all taxes and levies. Both transmission and distribution charges are 
included 
27
 Based on STEM examples: 5GWh, 30MWh, and 5000KWh consumers 
28
 National Grid will shortly be appointed as system operator for Great Britain as a whole 
29
 Based on a household with average consumption (18000KWh) 
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Balancing 
The conditions for the provision of balancing energy also make a vital contribution to the 
functioning of the electricity market. This is because electricity suppliers will not always be 
able to exactly match the quantity of power they inject into the network with the amount 
being used by their customers. This balancing service is fulfilled by the transmission system 
operators which, in turn, call on other generators in the market to provide the appropriate 
back-up. In the Directive, regulators are required to approve the methodology used to 
determine balancing prices. They may also intervene ex-post in requiring such charges to be 
revised.  
There are two main models adopted for the trading of electricity on the wholesale market in 
the EU, which affect the way balancing is organised. Most Member States organise trading on 
the basis of bilateral contracts between generators and suppliers or between generators and 
large industrial users. Where a supplier has not purchased a sufficient amount to cover the 
needs of its customers in any period, that supplier is out of balance. It therefore has to pay for 
extra energy to be injected by the TSO. The TSO, in turn, procures this electricity from the 
other generators in the market through a market process known as a “net pool”.  
The price paid by the out-of-balance supplier is often determined on the basis of the price at 
which the other generators offer balancing energy to the TSO. A further distinction is then 
whether there is a dual price system or a single price system. In the former, the price paid by 
suppliers which are “short” of energy is different to the price received by those which are 
“long” in energy. This maintains incentives on all suppliers to remain in balance. In a single 
price system, the same reference price is used for both “long” and “short” suppliers. In this 
case the TSO acts rather as a go-between through which those companies offering balancing 
energy buy from\ sell to other suppliers.  
The other approach to electricity trading, mainly used in Spain is for all exchanges of 
electricity to be conducted via a “mandatory pool”.
30
 This means that suppliers purchase all 
their energy in this way, including the energy required to cover any imbalances (both up and 
down) and, to an extent, the costs associated with balancing are socialised. Depending on how 
this is designed, this approach may tend to reduce the risks to new suppliers entering the 
market. At the same time, however, it may be a more costly scheme overall since network 
users have less incentive to minimise imbalances. A summary of the main balancing 
conditions is contained in Table 2.3 below. 
                                                 
30
 Bilateral hedging contracts known as “contracts for differences” may be used between generators and 
suppliers if they wish to agree a bilateral arrangement based on a fixed price. 
 EN 13   EN 
Table 2.3 Electricity Balancing Arrangements 
 
Balancing 
model31 
Balancing 
period 
(minutes) 
 
How are 
charges set 
 
Single price 
or dual 
price 
system 
Super-
national (S) 
National 
(N) 
or regional 
(R) 
balancing 
Intraday market 
possible 
“Gate 
closure”  
Dominant 
single 
generator 
within 
balancing 
area? 
 
% of 
balancing 
energy 
supplied by 
non national 
sites during 
2003 
Austria N 15 market other R planned day ahead Y 0% 
Belgium N 15 regulated D N yes “ex-post” Y n.k. 
Denmark N 60 market D S yes
32
 ½ hour N 25% 
Finland N 60 market D S yes ½ hour N n.k. 
France N 30 market D N yes 6during day  Y n.k. 
Germany N 15 market S R partial 3during day Y 0% 
Greece N 60 TSO S N no day ahead Y 4% 
Ireland N
33
 30 reg\mkt D N no day ahead Y n.k. 
Italy N/P 60 reg\TSO D R no day ahead Y 0% 
Lux not available 
Neth N 15 market D N Y 1 hour N marginal 
Portugal N 60 regulated D N Y 2during day Y 0% 
Spain P 60 market S N Y 2¼-3¼ hrs N 0% 
Sweden N 60 market D S Y 1 hour N n.k 
UK N 30 market D N Y ½ hour N n.k. 
Norway N 60 market S S Y 1 hour N significant 
Estonia N 60 TSO n.k. S N day ahead Y 0% 
Latvia N 60 TSO n.k. S N 2 hours N 0% 
Lithuania N 60 Reg/TSO n.k. N Y 2 hours Y some 
Poland N 60 market D N N day ahead N 0% 
Czech R N 60 market n.k. N Y 1½ hours Y 0% 
Slovakia N 60 regulated n.k. N N day ahead Y 25GWh 
Hungary N 15 regulated S N N day ahead Y 0% 
Slovenia N 60 market D N N day ahead Y 0% 
Cyprus N 30 TSO n.k. N N 6 hours Y no 
Malta not applicable, only one generation company 
Candidate Countries 
Romania N 60 market n.k. N N day ahead N 0% 
Bulgaria N 60 regulated n.k. N N day ahead N 0% 
Turkey N 300-660 market n.k. N N day ahead N n.k. 
Croatia not available 
source: Regulators, ETSO “Current State of Balance Management in Europe”, Dec 2003 
 
Balancing arrangements may cause problems for new suppliers for a number of reasons. For 
example, if the price for balancing energy is determined in a market framework, and there are 
                                                 
31
 N – bilateral trading and “net Pool” balancing market, P – “gross Pool” 
32
 for Denmark east region 
33
 expected to shift to mandatory pool in 2005 
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only one or two generators in a position to provide balancing services, the price charged may 
be unreasonable. 
The graphs below show an example of the prices paid for balancing energy in selected 
Member States during the month September 2004. The graph on the left shows the price paid 
to TSOs in the event that the supplier does not have electricity injected to cover demand. The 
graph on the right shows the price paid by TSOs in the event that too much electricity has 
been injected by a particular supplier. The further these two prices are apart, the greater the 
potential costs to suppliers where unexpected events occur.  
These graphs shows unfavourable conditions in a number of Member States, in particular 
where there are large differences between the buy and sell price prevailing in the country 
concerned. High prices to buy energy at periods of low demand, for example during the night 
need to be carefully examined by regulators when they assess the methodology being used to 
determine these.  
Graph 2.1 Prices for balancing energy in selected Member States, average for 1-30 
September 2004 
Paid to TSO for balance upwards   Paid by TSO for balance downwards 
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
160.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
hour
€/M
W
h
BE FR NL UK AT
CZ Bemax DE avg IE
 
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
160.00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
hour
€/M
W
h
AT BE BE min Nordic avg DE FR
IE NL UK CZ HU
 
source: TSO websites 
note; BEmax is the price paid\received in Belgium   
if the imbalance exceeds a certain threshold 
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Problems raised by large differences between the buy and sell price are exacerbated if there 
are insufficient opportunities for a supply company to minimise its imbalances through 
normal trading. If nominations cannot be modified close to real time and there is no intraday 
market, the supplier may find itself penalised for a imbalance that it could have resolved if 
more time was available. Even if trading opportunities are available, the concentrated 
structure in many Member States may also put new entrants at a disadvantage since they are 
forced into an unsatisfactory choice between trading with their main incumbent competitors, 
or being subject to balancing charges which their competitors also have a strong role in 
determining.  
In such circumstances direct regulatory involvement may be preferable. However at the very 
least, balancing markets need close regulatory supervision to ensure that the incumbent 
companies are not abusing their dominant position in the balancing market. In some cases it is 
still seen as appropriate for regulators to directly control the price at which balancing services 
are provided.  
In the medium term, significant improvements could be realised by integrating smaller 
balancing areas into larger blocks, both within and between Member States. This would 
improve the market structure considerably. The Nordic market has a partially integrated 
balancing market and measures are being considered between Germany and Austria. The 
introduction of demand side bidding has also been shown to bring about significant benefits. 
Conclusions 
Network Access conditions will need to be carefully overseen by national regulators to ensure 
non-discrimination. Suppliers need to have the confidence that the conditions they face in 
using the network are identical to those faced by other network users, including companies 
which are affiliated to the operators of those networks. The information reviewed above on 
network access and unbundling issues can be summarised in the table below.  
Table 2.4 Summary of Regulated Third Party Access 
Network Access LARGE USERS SMALLER USERS 
network tariffs out of line with 
norm or not available
34
 
GR
35
, LU  AT, BE, DE, GR, IT, LU 
Balancing   
balancing regime favourable\ prices 
in line with norm 
DK, FI, SE, UK, NO, IE, ES, 
some favourable elements AT, FR, IT, NL, PT, LT, LV, CZ, SK, HU, SI 
out of line with norm or unclear DE, BE, GR, EE, PL 
                                                 
34
 out of line implies a tariff significantly above €15/MWh for a large user connected at medium voltage 
and significantly above €40/MWh for a small users connected at low voltage. 
35
 distribution network tariffs are not available in Greece at present. 
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The unbundling of distribution system operators from supply companies would still appear to 
be inadequate to ensure competition in many Member States, particularly for households and 
small commercial customers. It is this area of restructuring which now needs to be the focus 
of Member States and regulators. 
Regulators should also work towards a more liquid and reliable market for balancing energy 
to prevent suppliers being faced with potentially penal charges. Suppliers should also be given 
more chance to remove their imbalances through intra-day trading. Greater integration of 
intraday and balancing markets would assist this objective. It would appear, in some cases at 
present, that suppliers operating outside their traditional areas are exposed to excessive risks 
relating to balancing and that an improvement in this area would considerable facilitate the 
functioning of the internal market. 
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ANNEX 3 Competition in the Electricity Sector 
Background 
A successful competitive market is more likely to develop where there are a sufficient number 
of players in both the generation and supply market. Where only a small number exist, the 
market may lack credibility with final customers and there will inevitably be concerns that 
prices are not determined competitively. This may then mean greater regulation of wholesale 
and retail markets than is necessary or desirable. This is why it is of the highest importance to 
establish a really integrated European energy market with the minimum of physical 
constraints and with no artificial barriers to trade such as market rules, access to grid 
conditions and customer switching practices. This would result in a significantly higher 
number of potentially competitive market participants. 
Generation Market Structure 
The key to the overall market structure is the generation sector. Experience in the electricity 
market to date has shown that there is a general tendency for integration between generation 
companies and supply companies in order to avoid exposure to risk. It therefore seems likely 
that, without regulatory intervention, the market structure in generation will be reflected into 
the structure of retail supply.  
Therefore, where generation capacity is concentrated in the hands of one, or a few companies, 
it is likely that the real possibility of consumers to switch supplier will be limited. This may in 
turn affect the performance of the market since companies will be able to keep prices higher 
than otherwise without fear of losing their share of the market. 
Development of liquid wholesale markets 
Liquid wholesale markets are an important component of competition in the electricity 
market. They are important since they offer the possibility for companies to purchase or sell 
electricity on reasonable terms in the event that their generation and supply portfolios do not 
match, for example where plant is offline or still being built. Without liquid markets, 
companies inevitably have to turn to other generators on an individual basis to provide such a 
back-up service. This means they, in effect, have to buy from their competitors, which will 
put new entrants at a significant disadvantage. 
Establishing a liquid market is much easier if there are a sufficient number of competitors 
since, in this case, there would be a general desire of all market actors to trade in such a way 
and no company would be able to gain an advantage through restricting the amount of 
capacity that it made available to other companies for purchase. This is something of an 
idealised solution and even well developed markets have to be carefully monitored to ensure 
companies are not seeking to take advantage of a privileged position in a certain location or 
time period.  
For those Member States with companies with very dominant position, it may be that their 
bidding behaviour into the market needs to be carefully monitored and regulated. Measures 
such as virtual power plant auctions are a form of regulated bidding and have helped create 
some liquidity in markets such as France. 
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Table 3.1  Wholesale Market development  
 
 
Total 
consumption 
TWh 
Volume 
traded in 
power 
exchange 
TWh 
Volume 
traded in 
standardised 
OTC market 
TWh 
 Total 
consumption 
TWh 
Volume 
traded in 
power 
exchange 
TWh 
Volume 
traded in 
standardised 
OTC market 
TWh 
Austria 54 1 n.k. Estonia 5 - - 
Belgium 78 - - Latvia 5 - - 
France 393 8  
Lithuani
a 
8 1.5 - 
Germany 499 39 342     
Netherlands 100 15 n.k. Poland 103 1 - 
    Czech R 51 - - 
Italy 282 15 56 Slovakia 23 - - 
    Hungary 31 - - 
Spain 207 204 4 Slovenia 12 0.4 - 
Portugal 43 - 6     
        
UK 333 35 2200     
Ireland 22 - -     
        
        
Norway     
Sweden     
Denmark     
Finland 
350 120 1200 
    
        
        
source: Regulators’ and electricity market participants’ submissions 
The degree of liquidity in spot markets and bilateral markets is summarised in Table 3.1 
below. Ideally, spot markets should have enough liquidity to give a reliable and transparent 
price signal. Meanwhile trading in “over the counter” (OTC) markets normally needs to be 
several times the volume of actual consumption in order for participants to trade without 
risking that particular individual transactions cause a shift in the market. The normal 
benchmark from other commodity markets is that the volume of trade should be roughly 10 
times the amount of physical deliver. Table 3.1 above shows that only a few markets, that is 
the UK and Nordic markets, are approaching this level. 
Interconnection and development of regional markets 
Building larger markets would help correct some of the problems associated with an 
inappropriate market structure. For example, as part of a larger regional market, the market 
positions of big incumbents such as EDF, EON and RWE would be smaller. Integration of 
national electricity markets requires additional infrastructure as well as clear and consistent 
rules concerning the allocation of capacity and the interaction of congestion management with 
the electricity wholesale market. 
As demonstrated in Table 3.2 below, the current levels of interconnection capacity remain at a 
rather low level when compared with the scale of the market power issues outlined in the 
section above. Furthermore, in comparison with the Nordic market, the degree of 
interconnection in other nascent regional markets is much lower in several cases. 
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Table 3.2  Interconnection and Market Structure 
 
 
Installed  
generation 
capacity 
(GW)
36
 
 
a 
Import 
capacit
y 
NTC
37
 
(GW) 
 
b 
Import 
capacity as 
% of 
installed 
capacity 
 
b ÷ a 
 Installed  
generation 
capacity 
(GW) 
 
a 
Import 
capacity 
NTC 
(GW) 
 
b 
Import capacity 
as % of installed 
capacity 
 
b ÷ a 
Belgium 16 4.6 29% Estonia 3 2.0 66% 
France 112 14.0 13% Latvia 3 3.6 100% 
Germany 109 12.2 11% Lithuania 6 3.1 50% 
Lux 1 1.0 90%     
Neth 20 4.7 17% Poland 34 3.5 10% 
Austria 18 4.3 24% Czech R 16 3.5 23% 
Italy 80 6.0 8% Slovakia 8 3.0 37% 
    Hungary 8 3.1 38% 
Portugal 12 1.0 8% Slovenia 3 2.1 68% 
Spain 56 2.2 4%     
    Greece 13 1.5 12% 
UK 80 2.3 3% Romania 22 3.5 16% 
Ireland 5 0.3 6% Bulgaria 10 2.0 20% 
    Turkey 28 1.9 7% 
Norway 23 4.2 18% Croatia 4 2.3 55% 
Sweden 27 7.8 29% Bosnia 2 0.9 45% 
Denmark 8 4.0 50% Serbia\Mon 
Finland 14 1.9 14% FYROM 
15 4.2 28% 
    Albania 2 0.5 25% 
        
 
Current Market Structure 
Table 3.3 overleaf depicts the current market structure in a selection of national and regional 
markets. Successful markets, such as the Nordic and UK market, have between five and ten 
major competitors, plus a range of fringe companies in the generation sector. In these 
circumstances it would appear that customers have a reasonable appreciation that a 
competitive market exists, both when prices are increasing as well as when they are falling. In 
other countries and regions market structure is less advantageous, particularly where 
individual Member States’ electricity markets are not sufficiently integrated with each other.  
Furthermore, many of the electricity generation markets in new Member States are 
characterised by the continuation of long term power purchase agreements. Thus, although 
there might appear to be an reasonable number of generation market participants in, for 
example Poland or Hungary, there is in fact very little scope for competition. The challenge 
for these countries is to both restructure these contracts and to achieve greater integration of 
their markets. 
                                                 
36
 UCTE July 2003 forecast, Nordel winter 2003-4 forecast, NGCand ESBNG 7 year statement. 
37
 Based on ETSO Winter 2004-05 NTC data, includes capacity from Switzerland and South East Europe, 
excludes Morocco Ukraine and Russia  
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The integration of individual electricity markets makes an important contribution to 
customers’ confidence in the market. In particular it will lead to an increase in the liquidity of 
wholesale markets, greater credibility of the prices that result, and a larger range of different 
contract structures. 
Table 3.3 Generation Market Structure
38
 
 Generation 
 Largest producer by 
capacity 
Top 3 producers 
by capacity 
Austria 45% 75% 
Germany 30% 70% 
Belgium 85% 95% 
Neth. 25% 80% 
Lux n.a. n.a. 
Denmark 
Finland 
Sweden 
Norway 
 
15% 
 
40% 
France 85% 95% 
Greece 100% 100% 
Ireland 85% 90% 
Italy 55% 75% 
Portugal 65% 80% 
Spain 40% 80% 
UK 20% 40% 
Estonia 90% 100% 
Latvia 95% 100% 
Lithuania 50% 80% 
Poland
39
 15% 35% 
Czech R 65% 75% 
Slovakia 75% 85% 
Hungary 30% 65% 
Slovenia 70% 95% 
Malta 100% 100% 
Cyprus 100% 100% 
 
Wholesale market developments and market surveillance 
Recent price developments in wholesale markets have been the subject of much discussion. 
As shown by the graphs below, prices in these markets have increased from roughly €20-
25/MWh in early 2003 to around €30-35/MWh today. Although prices have been volatile, a 
much more stable pattern has emerged since the beginning of 2004. 
                                                 
38
 rounded to nearest 5% 
39
 Consolidation is currently occurring in Poland. 
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Graph 3.1 Wholesale electricity prices: day-ahead spot price  
July 2002 – November 2004 
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source: relevant power exchange websites  
Graph 3.2 Wholesale electricity prices: Forward base-load for calendar year ahead 
 
source: IFIEC: Germany (blue), Netherlands (red) France (pink) UK (green) 
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However, forward prices for electricity to be delivered on a “year-ahead” basis demonstrated 
a significant increase in 2003 which has also continued into 2004 especially in the Dutch and 
UK markets. Prices have also increased in the non-standardised bilateral OTC market 
reported by market monitoring agencies. These increases appear to be the result of very high 
natural gas prices expected for the winter 2004-05 period in the UK which was the subject of 
an investigation from the regulator. 
Price increases are always likely to be questioned by consumers and there may be concerns 
about market power. Such concerns may arise naturally from the market structure and way the 
market is organised in each Member State without there necessarily being any illicit 
behaviour. Alternatively, the possibility exists that market participants are deliberately acting 
in a way to inflate prices directly or indirectly by influencing other competitive conditions. 
Clearly, at the same time, price movements might also be caused by shifts in the supply-
demand position as well as overall trends in global energy prices.  
Therefore, the situation needs to be closely monitored. In most cases, this type of market 
surveillance is the task of the competition authority in the Member States concerned, although 
the regulatory authority is usually consulted or involved in some other way. These are 
summarised in Table 3.4 below, including an indication of the quantity and nature of 
investigations and enquiries into competition issues. 
Table 3.4 Interaction between Competition Authorities \ Regulators in Electricity 
Markets 
 Role of 
regulator in 
Competition 
Law
40
 
Monitoring of 
wholesale\balancing 
market 
Number of 
investigations 
Nature of 
cases 
Outcomes 
involving 
penalites/ 
remedies 
Austria A regulator 2 Retail market 0 
Belgium A regulator studies 0 - - 
Denmark N TSO (Nordpool), Comp. 
Auth 
4
41
 Wholesale market 1 
Finland N TSO 0 - - 
France C regulator 1 Wholesale market 0 
Germany N Comp Authority (BKA) >10 Network access, 
Balancing  
remedies 
Greece N none 0 - - 
Ireland A regulator  0 - - 
Italy A regulator 0 - - 
Lux    - - 
Neth C regulator ongoing Wholesale market n.k. 
Portugal A regulator 0 - - 
Spain A regulator 1 Wholesale market penalty 
Sweden A TSO “some” Wholesale market - 
UK C regulator 0 - - 
Norway A TSO >10 Wholesale market 1 
Estonia N none 0 - - 
Latvia C none 0 - - 
Lithuania  none 0 - - 
Poland A regulator 1 Balancing remedy 
Czech R N none 0 - - 
                                                 
40
 A – advisory, C – concurrent powers\ regulator within competition authority, N –limited or no formal 
role 
41
 1 referred to Danish Competition Authorities by Nordpool, 3 merger cases 
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Slovakia N none 0 - - 
Hungary A regulator 0 - - 
Slovenia A regulator 0 - - 
Cyprus N none 0 - - 
Malta A regulator 0 - - 
source: Based on Submissions from regulators 
Many countries are trying to consider how, in future, to deal with the problem of 
concentration other than structural remedies such as divestment or capacity release. Greater 
transparency from generation companies about the projected availability of capacity, and 
guidelines on bidding behaviour of dominant generators would appear to be a possible avenue 
for a regulatory solution to the question of market concentration. Whereas for severe 
concentration problems, longer arrangements such as virtual power plant auctions also have 
potential. Without such solutions it seems likely that the main tool will still be the retention of 
price caps for end users which are prevalent in most Member States, which have the obvious 
risk of negating some of the benefits that competition is expected to deliver.  
Trends in retail markets 
As already noted it is expected that, over time, retail markets will come to be dependent on 
the market structure on the generation side. This is already true to a large extent judging from 
the information set out in Table 3.5 below. However, in some cases, the municipal suppliers 
retain a substantial share of the market, even if they are usually dependent on the main 
generation companies. Some consolidation might be expected over time. 
Table 3.5 Market shares retail supply 
 Number 
active licensed  
suppliers 
Number of 
suppliers 
independent 
of DSO 
Number 
with 
market 
share > 
5% 
 
Top 3 suppliers’ 
share (all 
consumers)
42
 
Market share of 
foreign  
owned suppliers 
Austria 144 19 4 67% 2% 
Belgium 41 17
43
 2 c. 90% <10% 
Denmark 69 23 5 67% n.k. 
Finland 70 8 6 30% 25% 
France 20-25 15 1 88% 9% 
Germany 1050 100 3 50%  c. 20% 
Greece 10 9 1 100%  0% 
Ireland 9 7 4 88% 12% 
Italy 305 270 6 35% n.k 
Lux 12 1 2 100% (2) 0% 
Neth. 37 16 3 88%
44
 18% 
Portugal 4 3 3 99% 33% 
Spain 70 62 5 85% 8% 
Sweden 127 127 4 70% 39% 
UK 80 66 6 60% 50% 
Norway 130 70 4 44% 2% 
Estonia 17 1 1 ? 3% 
Latvia 14 4 1 99% 0% 
                                                 
42
 includes both eligible and non-eligible markets 
43
 Although independent, the two most important suppliers have strong ownership links with DSO’s 
44
 for household customers 
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Lithuania 21 14 1 100% (1) 0% 
Poland 357 328 3 32% 17% 
Czech R 370 0 8 46% n.k. 
Slovakia 25 21 4 84% 28% 
Hungary 26 20 7 56% 97% 
Slovenia 76 71 6 71% 20% 
Cyprus 1 0 1 100%(1) 0% 
Malta 1 0 1 100%(1) 0% 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 55 47 1 45% 1% 
Bulgaria 9 0 n.k. 52% 0% 
Turkey 8 0 2 85% 0% 
Croatia n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 
Other Neighbouring Countries 
Bosnia 4 0 3 n.k. n.k. 
Serb\Mont. 11 0 n.k. 72% 0% 
FYROM 1 0 1 n.k. n.k. 
Albania 1 0 1 100% 0% 
Source: Eurostat: Regulators’ Survey Responses 
Conclusions 
Competition continues to develop in the electricity sector in the majority of Member States. In 
some cases, however, this development has been disappointing and there are some signs of 
stagnation and a lack of innovation on the part of suppliers. The summary table relating to 
market structure below shows an unsatisfactory position in most Member States.  
Table 3.6  Summary of Market Structure: Significant Market Participants
45
 
 Generation Supply 
six or more  UK, Nordic, PL UK, Nordic, IT, CZ 
three to six AT, DE, BE, NL, LU, IT, ES, PT, CZ, 
SK, SI, HU,  
AT, DE, IE, NL, PT, ES, PL, SK 
less than three FR, GR, IE, CY, MT, EE, LT, LV BE, FR, GR, LU, EE, LV, LT, CY, 
MT 
One consequence of this market structure are concerns that suppliers are becoming more 
conservative and are unwilling to venture out of their traditional areas or to offer a contract 
based on a stable long term price rather than the spot market. This is a sign that the market 
that is not functioning properly since suppliers should feel as comfortable serving customers 
in any part of the single market. They should also be prepared to negotiate with customers to 
find a mutually advantageous deal. It is crucial, especially as prices have risen in recent years, 
that customers have confidence in the functioning of the market. 
Member States need to follow an active competition policy. If structural remedies to 
dominance cannot be implemented immediately, then measures to ensure fair and transparent 
bidding in wholesale and balancing markets are imperative. A dominant position in 
generation risks foreclosing the supply market.  
                                                 
45
 Some Member State have been grouped into regions where appropriate. 
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ANNEX 4 Unbundling and Network Access: Gas 
Background 
As with electricity, fair network access conditions are crucial for the development of a 
competitive market. This refers to both the use of physical network access as well as the 
provision of ancillary services such as the provision of balancing energy. In order to ensure 
this, the new Directives require regulation of the methodologies used to set charges for these 
services and the legal and functional unbundling of both transmission and distribution 
networks operators. 
Unbundling 
The basis for ensuring non-discriminatory access to networks is the unbundling provisions in 
the second gas Directive. This required legal unbundling for transmission networks by 2004 
and for distribution by 2007. Table 4.1 below shows the latest position for the unbundling of 
the gas network businesses.  
Table 4.1 Network Unbundling: Gas 
Basic Unbundling 
Model 
Published accounts Compliance officer 
 
Separate 
corporate identity 
Separate HQ 
location 
Total Y  
TSO DSO TSO DSO TSO DSO TSO DSO TSO DSO  
Austria L L Y Y Y Y Y N Y (3/7) N 5½ 
Belgium L L Y Y Y Y
46
 Y Y Y Y
48
 7 
Denmark O L Y Y Y N Y N Y N 5 
France L A N N Y Y Y N Y N 4 
Germany A A N N N N N N N N 0 
Ireland M M N N Y Y N N N N 2 
Italy L L Y Y N N Y N Y mixed 5 
Lux M M Y Y Y N N N N N 3 
Neth L L Y Y Y Y Y N Y N 6 
Spain L L Y Y Y Y Y N Y N 6 
Sweden A A Y Y N N N N N N 2 
UK O O Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 8 
Estonia A. A N N Y Y N N N N 2 
Latvia A A N N N N N N Y Y 2 
Lithuania A A Y Y Y Y N N N N 4 
Poland L A N N N N N N N N 0 
Czech R N N N N N N N N N N 0 
Slovakia M M N N N N Y N N N 1 
Hungary L A Y Y N N Y N Y N 4 
Slovenia L A Y N N N N N N N 1 
Candidate Countries 
Romania L A Y Y N N Y N N Y 4 
Bulgaria A A Y Y Y N N N N N 3 
Turkey L L Y Y N N Y N Y N 4 
Croatia  not available 
source: Regulators’ Survey responses 
 
                                                 
46
 not in Flemish region 
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The table demonstrates that significant progress still remains to be made for full compliance 
with the provisions of the Directive and it can be stated that progress within Member States is 
significantly behind that for electricity. Infringement procedures may well be necessary 
regarding these Member States which will continue until the unbundling requirements are 
met. However it is expected that, during 2005, significant progress will be made, especially 
for transmission. Member States, in general, appear unwilling to implement legal unbundling 
of distribution companies at this stage, in advance of the required deadline. 
Network Access 
Among other things, strict rules on unbundling are necessary to ensure that network access 
charges are cost reflective and do not contain hidden cross subsidies. A key task of regulators 
is therefore to ensure that network operators do not earn excessive profits. Otherwise this 
may, for example, enable vertically integrated companies to run their affiliated supply 
business at a loss and allow predatory pricing. Regulators also need to ensure appropriate cost 
allocation on shared services and that tariff structures are non-discriminatory and apply 
equally to all network users, including affiliated and non-affiliated suppliers. 
Table 4.2 below provides the latest available information from regulators on network tariffs 
currently being paid by a range of customers. These still show a significant degree of 
divergence. Member States appear to have network tariffs (especially in the distribution 
segment) significantly above the average and the reason for this should be closely examined 
by regulators in their approval of tariff methodologies. More and more emphasis must also be 
laid on the charging aspect in the distribution areas as these account for a significant element 
of final bills. 
The structure of tariffs is also important, particularly for transmission. Many Member States’ 
TSOs have now introduced entry-exit systems which appear to be more conducive to a 
competitive market and allow for greater coherence between Member States. Further progress 
is needed in this field in order to make the transmission of gas more understandable at a 
European level. 
Postalised tariffs are also widely used in many Member States. Although this is a simple 
system, its general application may lead to a risk of pancaking for transactions affecting more 
than one TSO or Member State as the more TSOs affected, the higher the charge will be. In 
general, only the smallest Member States and those where there is no predictable aggregate 
direction of flow could a purely postalised system be seen as fully cost reflective, although in 
some cases it may be a reasonable approximation. 
 EN 27   EN 
Table 4.2 Gas Network Tariffs 
 
number of transmission 
companies 
Estimated networks charges  
(€/MWh)  
 
national regional 
tariff 
structure
47
 
Number of 
distribution 
companies 
Eurostat 
category 
I4 
Eurostat 
category 
I1 
Eurostat 
category 
D3 
Austria
+
 3 4 entry-exit 20 2.0-3.0 10.0 13.0 
Belgium 1 0 entry-exit 19 2.0 4.5 10.5 
Denmark
+
 1 0 entry-exit 4 2.0 6.0 n.k. 
France 3 0 entry-exit 22 1.0
48
 9.5 13.0 
Germany
+
 15 20 mixed
49
 730 2.5 10.5 n.k. 
Ireland 1 0 entry-exit 1 4.5 14.0  
Italy 2 0 entry-exit 557 2.5 n.k. 8.0 
Luxembourg 1 0 postalised 4 1.0   
Netherlands 1 0 entry-exit 27 1.0 2.5 3.0 
Spain 3 6 postalised 25 2.5 11.0 21.5 
Sweden
+
 1 2 postalised 7 5.0   
UK 1 0 entry-exit 1 2.5 4.5 6.5 
Estonia 0 0 postalised 11 n.k.   
Latvia 1 0 postalised 1 3.5 4.0 4.0 
Lithuania 1 0 postalised 5 4.2 6.2 8.7 
Poland 1 6 postalised 68 5.0 8.0 8.0 
Czech R 1 0 n.k. 124 n.k.   
Slovakia 1 0 postalised 1 6.5 8.0  
Hungary 1 0 postalised 11 2.5 5.5 5.5 
Slovenia 1 0 postalised 17 1.1   
Candidate Countries 
Romania 1 0 postalised 21 2.5 2.5 2.5 
Bulgaria 1 0 postalised 30 1.1 7.0 12.5 
Turkey 1 0 postalised 24 2.5 4.5 4.5 
Croatia not available 
source: CEER Monitoring Reports: 8
th
 Madrid Forum, July 2004 
rounded to nearest €0.5/MWh 
+  No data submitted by regulators. Estimates based on those in 3
rd
 draft benchmarking report.  
Finally, the flexibility of capacity reservation procedures also makes an important 
contribution to the scope for a competitive supply market. Rules need to allow network users 
to change their position frequently and allow equal opportunities to all market participants to 
use the network. This is reviewed in Table 4.3 below. 
 
 
                                                 
47
 point to point charges remain in place for some existing transit contracts: e.g. Austria 
48
 Assuming connected direct to transmission, all based on entry Tasniere, exit Paris 
49
 both BEB and Ruhrgas have very recently introduced access regimes with some entry-exit elements. 
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Table 4.3 Gas Network Access Conditions: Compliance with Madrid Guidelines 
 Minimum booking 
period firm service 
Minimum period  
interruptible 
services  
type of capacity 
booking 
capacity allocation 
rule decided by: 
allocation 
method 
use it or lose it? 
Austria 1 day\ 1 month
50
 1 month entry-exit TSO fcfs yes 
Belgium 1 week 1 year point-point regulator\TSO fcfs yes 
Denmark 1 day 1 day entry-exit regulator\TSO fcfs yes 
France 1 month 1 year entry-exit 
51
 regulator\TSO fcfs yes 
Germany 1 day 1 day mixed TSO fcfs partial 
Ireland 1 year not offered point-point regulator\TSO fcfs yes 
Italy 1 year 1 day entry-exit regulator fcfs yes 
Luxembourg 1 year not offered entry-exit TSO fcfs no 
Netherlands 1 day 1 day entry-exit TSO fcfs yes 
Spain no minimum not offered entry-exit regulator fcfs yes 
Sweden 1 year not offered point-point regulator\TSO fcfs no 
UK 1 day 1 day entry regulator\TSO auction yes 
Estonia 1 day not offered n.k. TSO fcfs short term 
Latvia n.k. not offered n.k. n.k. n.k. no 
Lithuania 1 day not offered n.k. regulator “other” yes 
Poland 1 month 1 month n.k. TSO fcfs no 
Czech R n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. n.k. 
Slovakia 1 year not offered point-point TSO n.k. no 
Hungary 3 days 3 days entry-exit TSO auction no 
Slovenia 1 day not offered n.k. regulator\TSO fcfs no 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
Turkey 
Croatia 
 
not covered in this report 
source: CEER Monitoring Reports: 8
th
 Madrid Forum, July 2004  
 
Balancing 
Balancing rules are one of the most important aspect of whether granted third party access is 
effectively non-discriminatory and whether a given market/region offers realistic 
opportunities for market participants, especially for potential new market entrants. The costs 
of getting the commodity to the end-use customer should be predictable in advance, including 
the possible financial risks in the event that some problem occurs in the supply chain, or in 
case of unexpected demand patterns. 
The financial risks stem in part from the respective balancing rules. As gas physically travels 
from production sites to its final consumption destination, it is often necessary for a market 
participant to take into account several balancing regimes to cover full market risk and 
hedging possibilities along the chain are generally more limited than in electricity markets. It 
is also more challenging to realise portfolio effects with respect to supply diversity. It is 
therefore important for all market participants to know well in advance all elements of the 
respective balancing market regime. Charges for imbalances must be either market based 
                                                 
50
 1 month for transit, 1 day for domestic flow. 
51
 within individual zones 
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and/or reflective of the real costs of managing the network rather than being based on 
arbitrary penalties. 
Table 4.4 Summary of Gas balancing rules  
 Balancing period Conditions 
set/approved by 
Tolerance  
bands 
Premium for “short” 
imbalance over 
tolerance band (x 
market price) 
Pooling and trading allowed allowed 
Austria hourly market no market based price ex-post 
Belgium daily TSO\regulator 10% +140-180% ex-ante 
Denmark daily TSO\regulator 15%\5% +20% ex-ante 
France daily regulator 20% +50% ex-ante 
Germany hourly/daily TSO 15% +100-420% ex-ante 
Ireland daily TSO\regulator 3% +40% max ex-post 
Italy daily regulator 8% +10% max ex-post 
Luxembourg daily TSO\regulator 5%/3% +50% max ex-ante 
Netherlands hourly/daily regulator 2/13% up to +180% ex-ante, ex-post with penalty 
Spain
52
 daily TSO\Ministry  +50% no 
Sweden daily n.k. n.k. n.k. ex-ante 
UK daily market zero usually <20% ex-post 
Estonia daily TSO yes at market price no 
Latvia hourly TSO 10% n.k. n.k. 
Lithuania daily TSO yes n.k. no 
Poland daily TSO no not decided ex-post 
Czech R rules not yet in place 
Slovakia hourly TSO no n.k. no 
Hungary daily regulator yes + €1.5/MWh
53
 no 
Slovenia daily TSO\regulator yes n.k. ex-ante 
Candidate Countries 
Romania monthly TSO no n.k. no 
Bulgaria daily TSO\regulator yes n.k. no 
Turkey daily market yes n.k. no 
Croatia not available 
source: CEER Monitoring Report 2004  
 
The collected data in Table 4.4 demonstrates the prevailing of daily balancing period regimes. 
However, it must be mentioned that often hourly tolerance levels are also established within a 
daily regime, having as an effect that acting in daily regimes sometimes also necessitates 
hourly balancing action.  
As a general statement it must be differentiated between physical balancing activities and 
financial balancing activities. It is the role of the TSO (GGP 2) to provide for system 
integrity, meaning the safe operation of the grid within the physical tolerance levels (which is 
an ongoing activity), and the role of the shipper to balance the nominations made and the 
physical input/outtake. Sometimes indicated balancing periods do not reflect the physical side 
but the financial cash out period (only). The looser the tolerance limits/balancing period for 
shippers are the more flexibility tools a TSO must contract for, meaning access to safe gas 
resources. These contracts can often only be provided (on a firm basis) by the dominant 
market participant of that area or via a direct contract for storage, meaning a considerable 
                                                 
52
 new network code is currently under discussion 
53
 approx. equivalent to HUF 0.1/MJ 
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amount of annual fixed costs. There is thus a trade off between first sight generous 
“flexibility” of systems and considerable socialised costs attached to it.  
It can also be seen that most balancing rules result of a joint effort by TSO and the regulatory 
authorities. If no market solutions are in place it is the role of the regulatory authorities to 
prevent artificial barriers to market entrants, however taking into account the necessity of 
physical balancing incentives. A “dynamic” approach, taking into account the overall physical 
position of the system and the charges for out-of balance positions might be a good solution.  
A considerable range of tolerance bands exist. As stated, the effect of tolerance bands has to 
be jointly assessed with the imbalance charges. Zero tolerance might allocate incurred costs 
most effectively, however in that case it must be assured that the unit “out-of-balance”, which 
will always exist must not be excessively charged if the system is overall balanced and it must 
be clear that each participant has access to risk hedging facilities (e.g. a balancing market). 
The avoided costs (for reduced overhead socialising) might be higher than the small amounts 
of out of balance charges, bringing an overall positive effect to pricing. In markets with static 
premium, tolerance levels must exist to ensure market opportunities for actors without a big 
portfolio. Pooling of imbalance positions is one of the possible tools to allow for risk hedging 
and to assure charges set in line with the overall incurred costs. Pooling of imbalances (also 
between customers within a given control area), ex-ante, ex-post or both is usually a strong 
means of attracting market participants. 
As a general line it might be assumed that in the beginning phase of a competitive market for 
natural gas, (no intra-day/online balancing market mechanism) balancing periods should be 
longer and tolerance periods larger, thus socialising a significant share of the costs incurred 
between the market participants, which have ultimately to be born by the final customers. 
End-users with stable, flat consumption and a low swing factor have to cross subsidise 
volatile consumers, however easing market opportunities for new entrants.  
Care must be taken about excessive, “static” out-of-balance charges, which do not respect the 
effective physical situation of the system and do not provide for “netting effects”. In cases 
where no balancing markets are installed the regulatory authorities might have a role to 
carefully assess the effects of such static balancing charges on the market attractiveness; 
established intra-day balancing markets give effective price signals and regulatory authorities 
might in such cases limit their tasks to monitor and detect eventual abuse of a dominant 
position in the balancing market (persistent high prices). Where intraday balancing tools exist, 
there might be scope to take care of minimising effects of cross subsidisation between energy 
markets (balancing periods merely in line between gas and electricity markets) and tolerance 
levels might be tighter.  
Storage 
Whereas balancing services relate to short term differences between injection and withdrawal, 
gas storage serves the purpose of dealing with thee fact that demands in winter months are 
always far in excess of summer demand. For households this “swing” ratio may be as much as 
1:10. By contrast, gas is usually purchased from producers with a flat profile and the 
availability of storage is therefore a pre-requisite for any company seeking to enter the 
market. 
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Unlike the transmission networks, storage is not necessarily a natural monopoly. There are 
also other flexibility instruments that can provide the same service to an extent. At the same 
time, however, there are only a limited amount of suitable geological conditions available for 
the development of storage, usually depleted fields. Where these are largely in the hands of 
the incumbent company, third party access is required to ensure competition further down the 
line. The Directives require negotiated access to storage where it is technically and 
economically necessary for competition. Guidelines for access to storage are currently being 
discussed in the context of the Madrid Forum and a more detailed analysis of compliance with 
good practice and the impact of storage on gas competition will be carried out following these 
discussions.  
Conclusions 
In general, the third party access regime for gas is not as well developed and well regulated as 
that for electricity. This is clearly demonstrated by the table below which summarises the 
current position. 
Table 4.5 Summary of Regulated Third Party Access 
Pipeline Access  
Network tariffs in line with norm\ flexible 
TPA service 
BE, DK, NL, UK, HU, SI, IT, 
High network charges or inflexible service AT, FR, ES, LV,  
High network charges and inflexible service DE, IE, SE, PL, EE, LT, CZ, SK 
Balancing  
Favourable conditions: cost/market based AT, UK, IT 
some favourable elements DE, DK, ES, FR, SE, BE, IE, HU, SI 
unfavourable or unclear NL, LU, EE, LT, LV, PL, CZ, SK 
Although some improvement has been recorded during 2004, there are still numerous 
difficulties associated with access to the network for new entrants in the market. Often it is 
the case that although one aspect of third party access such as tariffs may be favourable, 
others such as balancing charges or flexibility arrangements are not. Availability of capacity 
remains a problem at certain points in the network which are the subject of long term 
reservations. The guidelines agreed at the Madrid Forum and incorporated into the proposed 
Regulation should allow this to begin to be addressed ensuring that a greater range of network 
users can participate in the market at those points. Increasing the effectiveness of regulation 
through the implementation of the Directive will also be of key importance. 
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ANNEX 5 Competition in the Gas Sector 
Background 
Natural gas markets have been designed with an international perspective in most cases, as 
domestic production could not cope with demand increase. Hence systems are very 
interlinked and most large market actors are present in a large number of countries, at least in 
the former transit business.  
Given the small number of indigenous resources, the strong dependence on external supply 
areas with monopolistic and protected markets and the heavy economies of scale in the 
upstream business, this has resulted in a limited number of competitors in the field of gas 
production. Under these conditions it is of extreme importance to provide for accessible 
markets within the whole of the EU to allow for calculable business opportunities and to 
attract new players to enter that market. This is very true for the transmission layer, to be able 
to get bulk gas from the source to the destination area but even more so for the effective 
opening of the distribution area, as it is quite useless to ship gas for many km to find the 
connection between the TSO system and the inlet of the customer economically blocked by 
vertically integrated incumbent suppliers.  
On the other hand, it is extremely important to allow distribution companies (there are several 
thousand in the EU) to be active on an international scale to get supplies directly, or, in the 
best case, to provide for open systems until the end-user layer in order to allow for direct 
pooling/clustering of end-user demand in a control area, which for itself should be as large as 
possible.  
Current Upstream Market Structure 
Table 5.1 below shows that most national markets still exhibit the characteristics of monopoly 
provision, backed up by long term relationships with procedures and long term capacity 
reservations. However there are some areas where this is gradually being broken down, 
particularly in the coastal regions which have access to a greater range of physical sources of 
gas, including LNG. Germany also has considerable, untapped as yet, potential for 
competition given the range of different companies involved in the upstream market. In other 
cases, particularly for the new Member States, the amount of market participants remains 
limited. This will remain the case while barriers to certain forms of cross border transactions 
continue to exist. 
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Table 5.1  Market Structure in Import and Production of Gas 
 
 
% of gas 
from 
domestic 
producti
on 
% of gas 
from 
imports 
(no. of 
sources) 
No. of 
companies 
with at 
least 5% 
share of 
available 
gas
54
 
% of available gas 
controlled by 
largest company 
Gas release 
programme 
Existence of NBP 
type trading 
Austria 23% 77% (3) 1 >90% yes limited 
Belgium 0% 100% (3) 1 92% no significant 
Denmark 93% 7% (1) 1 80-85% yes planned 
France 3% 97% (6) 1 91% planned no 
Germany 18% 82% (4) 12 50% in progress no 
Ireland 16% 84% (1) 5 40% no no 
Italy 18% 82% (4) 3 68% in progress limited 
Luxembourg 0% 100% (3) not meaningful 
Netherlands 88% 12% (2) 1 60% no limited 
Spain 1% 99% (11) 4 40% completed limited 
Sweden 0% 100% (1) 1 97% no no 
UK 92% 8% 5 25% completed signficant 
Estonia 0% 100% (1) 3 50% no no 
Latvia 0% 100% (1) 1  100% no no 
Lithuania 0% 100% (1) 2 59% no no 
Poland 33% 67% (4) 1 98% no no 
Czech R 1% 99% (2) 1 99% no no 
Slovakia 2% 98% (1) 1 100% no no 
Hungary 15% 85% (4) 1 100% no no 
Slovenia 1% 99% (3) 1 100% no no 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 70% 30% (1) 4 87% yes limited 
Bulgaria 1% 99% (1) 1 100% yes no 
Turkey 3% 97% (4) 1 97% yes no 
Croatia      no 
source: Regulators’ survey responses 
 
Trends in Wholesale Gas Markets and Market Surveillance 
Wholesale trading in gas is becoming more prevalent with a number of Member States having 
developed gas exchanges or “hubs”. However progress is rather behind that for electricity due 
to the very unfavourable market structure. This has consequences for the transparency of price 
formation in the market. This is an important problem since more liquid markets would 
encourage competition and security of supply. If new suppliers have access to gas in a liquid 
market, the problems associated with fluctuations in demand become less acute and it is easier 
to maintain a balanced portfolio. Similarly, companies will be more encouraged to make the 
required investments to import gas to Europe if there is always a liquid wholesale market into 
which gas can be sold in the absence of a specific buyer. The UK market is based on a 
“virtual” balancing point in the network. This is made possible by and entry-exit tarification 
system which allows all injected gas to be traded on a consistent “entry paid” basis. Similar 
virtual hubs have been set up in the Netherlands and in Italy.
55
 Other trading points have been 
                                                 
54
 available gas from either local production or import, figures refer to 2001. 
55
 known as TTF (Netherlands) and PCV(Italy) 
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formed at Bunde in Germany, Zeebrugge in Belgium and at Baumgarten in Austria. However 
these do not usually give the same liquidity as a harmonised single trading point for gas. As 
well as prices indices produced by these exchanges, the price of imported gas at the borders of 
some Member States is also reported regularly. The graph below summarises the most recent 
price data from gas wholesale markets. 
Table 5.2 Development of Wholesale Gas Prices 
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source: Argus Gas Connections 
Table 5.2 shows that gas prices increased during 2004, particularly those relating to the Q1 
2005 period. UK wholesale gas prices show a significant overshooting of the continental price 
which has led to concerns about market manipulation. A recent investigation by the UK 
regulator suggested that some increase in transparency relating to offshore facilities and the 
operation of the interconnector was needed. It also called for the further development of 
competition in continental European gas markets. 
Supply Market 
Table 5.2 shows that the nature of the supply market varies considerably by Member State. 
Even though the wholesale gas market is rather concentrated, there are rather more 
competitors in the supply market, although these are often still restricted to a local area based 
around their existing distribution zone. In most cases, some consolidation has occurred and 
there is usually just a handful of significant competitors in each Member State.  
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Table 5.2  Retail Supply and Consumer Choice Supplier market share 
 Number of 
active 
licensed 
suppliers 
Suppliers 
independent  
of DSO 
No. of 
suppliers with 
> 5% share 
Top 3 
suppliers’ 
share56 
Share of foreign owned suppliers 
Austria 29 6 3 90% n.k. 
Belgium 16 16
57
 3 95% 5% 
Denmark 8 4 4 65% 4% 
France 11 10 2 91% 3% 
Germany 760 n.k. 0 10% n.k. 
Ireland 10 9 4 88% 23% 
Italy 410 338 5 63% n.k. 
Luxembourg 6 1 1 n.k. n.k. 
Netherlands 27 7 3 87%
58
 31% 
Spain 21 6 4 80% 19% 
Sweden 7 0 5 79% 60% 
UK 112 112 6 82% 27% 
Estonia 2 0 1 100% 0% 
Latvia 1 0 1 100% 0% 
Lithuania 13 9 4 99% 0% 
Poland 77 3 6 65% <5% 
Czech R 133 3 7 59% n.k. 
Slovakia 1 0 1 100% 49% 
Hungary 19 11 7 62% 69% 
Slovenia 41 22 4 86% 0% 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 24 3 5 75% 0% 
Bulgaria 30 0 6 42% 0% 
Turkey 1 1 1 100% 0% 
Croatia no information available 
Source: Regulators’ survey responses 
Conclusions 
Gas markets remain very concentrated at national level and this forms a severe obstacle to the 
development of competition and an open market. This is summarised in the table below. The 
level of integration of national markets in terms of supply remains low, despite the fact that 
most gas crosses at least one border during the delivery process. There remain considerable 
regulatory barriers which are retarding unnecessarily the development of the European gas 
market. 
                                                 
56
 includes both eligible and non-eligible markets 
57
 Although independent, the two most important suppliers have strong ownership links with DSOs 
58
 households only 
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Table 5.4 Summary of Market Structure 
Wholesale Gas market Retail Gas Supply 
largest shipper < 50% IE, ES, UK 6 or more DE, UK, PL, CZ, HU 
largest shipper 50-90% DE, IT, EE, LT, NL 3-6 suppliers AT, BE, DK, IE, IT, 
NL, ES, SE, LT, SI 
largest shipper > 90%  AT, BE, FR, LU, SE, 
LV, PL, CZ, SK, HU, 
SI 
1-3 main suppliers FR, LU, EE, LV, SK 
The most important feature of the gas market hindering competition is the continuation of 
segmentation of the market on national lines. If this problem were to be resolved a much more 
vigorous market would start to become evident. This is already occurring to a degree in some 
areas such areas around the North Sea and in southern European markets provided that access 
condition and the regulatory framework are supportive of competition. However barriers to 
competition remain in virtually all parts of the European Union. 
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ANNEX 6  Security of Supply Data 
6.1 Electricity: Current Position 
Table 6.1 overleaf summarises the information contained in the most recent UCTE reports on 
Power Balances in European Union as well as information collected from similar TSO 
organisations in those Member States not part of UCTE.  
This table shows the improvements in the supply demand position which has have taken place 
since 2003 during which a number of difficulties were recorded relating to supply-demand, 
particularly during the heatwave in central Europe that summer. Construction of new capacity 
in, for example, Italy means that the degree of reserve capacity is expected to be substantially 
better in 2005. Some improvement is also expected in the Nordic region for which there has 
previously been some concerns. Nordel the relevant grouping of TSOs, in its most recent 
publication, still highlights potential difficulties in the event of an extremely cold winter. 
Ireland still has a very tight supply-demand position which led to a tender process for new 
capacity being launched. However a further announcement by Viridian to build a second 
CCGT close to Dublin will help resolve the problems in the medium term. The position in 
Greece also remains marginal although new additions to interconnection infrastructure and 
greater co-operation in the south east Europe region is likely to reduce the likelihood of any 
difficulties. 
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Table 6.1  Electricity Security of Supply 
 Actual reserve 
capacity during 2003:  
lowest monthly value (GW)
59
 
Forecast amount of reserve 
generation capacity 2005  
(GW) 
60
 
as % of 
generation 
capacity 
import capacity 
(% generation 
capacity) 
61
 
Austria
62
 3.8 5.4 30% 22% 
Belgium 0.4 -0.1 0% 29% 
Denmark 0.4 0.8 8% 51% 
Finland -0.8 -0.8 -6% 25% 
France 3.8 9.8 10% >10% 
Germany 3.2 4.5 5% 14% 
Greece 0.4 -0.4 -2% 10% 
Ireland - 0.0 0% 6% 
Italy -1.7 3.5 2% 12% 
Luxembourg 0.4 0.4 24% 90% 
Netherlands 2.5 1.0 4% 17% 
Portugal 0.7 1.3 12% 8% 
Spain 6.0 7.3 11% 5% 
Sweden -4.0 0.2 0% 29% 
UK - n.k. c.10% 3% 
Norway 2.0 0.6 5% 18% 
Estonia - n.k.  75% 
Latvia - n.k.  >100% 
Lithuania - 1.3 27% 50% 
Poland 6.4 6.3 12% 10% 
Czech R 1.3 2.3 16% 23% 
Slovakia 0.4 0.2 5% 44% 
Hungary -0.1 0.0 5% 22% 
Slovenia 0.0 0.2 8% 53% 
Cyprus - n.k. 26% - 
Malta - n.k. 25% - 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 1.3 1.3 11% 6% 
Bulgaria 2.1 2.1 20% 10% 
Turkey - n.k. n.k. 7% 
Croatia 1.0 1.3 32% 55% 
Other Neighbouring Countries 
Bosnia 0.9 0.8 
Serb\Mont. -0.8 0.1 
FYROM 0.0 0.1 
6% 20% 
Albania - n.k. n.k. 30% 
source: UCTE, Nordel, NGC, ESBNG 
                                                 
59
 UCTE 2003 Power Balance Retrospective: June 2004, Nordel figure based on “Power and Energy Balances, Retrospect 2003, 
Forecast 2007; published June 2004 
60 According to UCTE definition of “remaining capacity” = “guaranteed capacity” minus “load at 11 am” as a percentage of “total 
generation capacity”. Power Balance of UCTE: Forecast 2004-10, published 19 January 2004. Forecast for 2005: lowest value 
from January or July.  
 
Nordel figure based on “Power and Energy Balances, Retrospect 2003, Forecast 2007; published June 2004. Forecast 2007/08, 
normal winter temperatures 
 
UK based on NCG seven year statement, “plant margin 2005/06 = 22%” adjusted to approximately correspond to “remaining 
capacity” definition with outages\overhauls and system reserve = 10% and non-usable capacity 0-5%.  
 
Ireland based on ESB NG Generation Adequacy Report 2004-10: Published November 2003. Results for 2005 median 
assumptions on availability and demand growth, interconnector deducted. 
 
61 Based on ETSO NTC winter 2004-05 including Switzerland, Ukraine, Russia and Morocco 
62 High levels of reserve capacity reported result from inclusion of storage plant capacity of some 6,4 GW.  
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Table 6.2 shows that the main policies currently adopted by Member States in order to 
encourage generation. It shows that most countries have either implemented or are 
considering some form of capacity support mechanism and very few have a market based 
solely on the energy price. However, the key to encouraging investment above all is a stable 
regulatory framework with commitment by regulators and Member States on a medium to 
long term basis of their particular approach to this question. 
Table 6.2 Measures to support electricity security of supply 
 Incentives 
e.g. capacity 
payments  
Obligation on 
TSO or 
suppliers
63
 
Existing long 
term  
PPAs  
Tender by 
Regulator or TSO 
Austria x    
Belgium  (x)   
Denmark     
Finland     
France    (x) 
Germany     
Greece    x 
Ireland x   x 
Italy x    
Luxembourg  
Netherlands  (x)   
Portugal (x)  x  
Spain x    
Sweden x (x)   
UK     
Norway x    
Estonia   x  
Latvia     
Lithuania x (x)   
Poland   x  
Czech R   x  
Slovakia   x  
Hungary   x  
Slovenia     
Cyprus     
Malta     
source: Regulators’ survey responses 
6.3 Gas Security of Supply 
Table 6.3 below summarises similar information for gas that has been collected from national 
regulatory authorities. 
                                                 
63
 (x) = under consideration 
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Table 6.3  Current Security of Supply Position: Gas 
 Security of Supply Position 2003 
(bcm) 
 
consumption amount of 
local 
production 
import 
capacity64 
total supply capacity increase in 
consumption 
2003.v. 2002 (% 
p.a.)  
Austria 9 2 34 36 +8% 
Belgium 16 0 36
65
 36 +7% 
Denmark 4 7 2 9 +2% 
France 46 2 70 72 +5% 
Germany 86 15 87 102 +4% 
Italy 76 14 238 252 +9% 
Ireland 4 0 4 4 +2% 
Luxem. 1 0 4 4 n.k. 
Netherl. 46 70 25 95 0% 
Spain 24 0 21 21 +15% 
Sweden 1 0 2 2 +1% 
UK 106 103 10 113 +2% 
Estonia 1 0 2 2 n.k. 
Latvia 2 0 2 2 +1% 
Lithuania 3 0 6 6 +9% 
Poland 12 4 9 13 +4% 
Czech R 10 0 12 12 +3% 
Slovakia 7 0 90 90 +5% 
Hungary 14 2 15 17 +2% 
Slovenia 1 0 4 4 +4% 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 18 13 12 25 -1% 
Bulgaria 3 0 6 6 +6% 
Turkey 21 1 26 27 +20% 
Croatia no information 
source: Regulators’ survey responses, GTE website 
This analysis shows that some countries have a relatively urgent need for investment in 
additional import capacity, particularly the UK and Ireland, Spain and possibly Poland. These 
investments do, however, seem to be coming forward and a number of projects are being 
planned to bring additional gas to the European market. 
                                                 
64
 From all physical import pipelines directly or indirectly linked to producing countries plus LNG, source 
GTE. 
65
 plus 48 bcm/year transit capacity 
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ANNEX 7  PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PROTECTION OF CONSUMER RIGHTS 
Electricity 
Background 
Energy network industries provide “services of general economic interest” and following the 
sectoral approach described in the Commission’s white paper on services of general interest 
(Com (2004) 364 final) Member States have the possibility to impose on electricity and gas 
utilities public service obligations. Such public service obligations may relate to “security, 
including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and environmental 
protection”. Such obligations need to be “clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and 
verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for EU electricity companies to national 
consumers”.  
The integration of high standard public service obligations and customer protection within the 
framework of a liberalised market is a primary goal of the new Art. 3 of the electricity and gas 
Directives. However, subsidiary remains the principle governing the implementation. The 
benefits of an open market with new suppliers able to offer more competitive prices and 
services should be in line with the implementation of these public service obligations.  
Since July 2004 non-household customers are free to choose their supplier and by July 2007 
household customers will also be eligible customers, customer protection should be tailor-
made according to these stages of market opening, allowing customers to be sufficiently 
informed to make intelligent price comparisons. 
Transparency regarding general contractual terms and conditions is also required. The full 
implementation of Annex A of the new electricity and gas Directives is needed in order to 
provide the appropriate protection for electricity and gas customers. 
The electricity and gas Directives stipulate that when a financial compensation is granted by a 
Member States to fulfil public service obligations, this should be done in full compliance with 
the principles of transparency and non-discrimination. In its judgment in the case of Altmark 
Trans GmbH1, the Court of Justice of the European Communities held that public service 
compensation does not constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 87 of the EC Treaty 
provided that four criteria are met: 
• First, the recipient undertaking must actually have public service obligations to discharge, 
and the obligations must be clearly defined.  
• Second, the parameters on the basis of which the compensation is calculated must be 
established in advance in an objective and transparent manner, to avoid it conferring an 
economic advantage which may favour the recipient undertaking over competing 
undertakings. 
• Third, the compensation cannot exceed what is necessary to cover all or part of the costs 
incurred in the discharge of public service obligations, taking into account the relevant 
receipts and a reasonable profit. 
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• Fourth, where the undertaking which is to discharge public service obligations, in a 
specific case, is not chosen pursuant to a public procurement procedure which would allow 
for the selection of the tendered capable of providing those services at the least cost to the 
community, the level of compensation needed must be determined on the basis of an 
analysis of the costs which a typical undertaking, well run and adequately provided with 
means of transport so as to be able to meet the necessary public service requirements, 
would have incurred in discharging those obligations, taking into account the relevant 
receipts and a reasonable profit for discharging the obligations. 
Universal service 
Universal service is a new provision of Art. 3 - Directive 2003/54/EC. The concept is defined 
as the “right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their territory at 
reasonable, easily and clearly comparable prices. From the following table (7.1) it can be seen 
that in (nearly) all Member States there exists an obligation to connect and supply all 
electricity customers, especially household customers.  
The Supplier of Last Resort (SOLR) is a necessary fall-back position to protect customers in 
case of: 
• Bankruptcy of the current supplier 
• Supply of vulnerable customers, being unable to pay 
• Supply to Remote customers 
The supplier of last resort designated by Member States is in the vast majority of cases the 
Distribution System Operator. 
Vulnerable customers 
This class of consumer is difficult to define in general and will mainly depend on the specific 
national or local circumstances. A majority of Member States have introduced regulations to 
protect vulnerable customers via social tariffs or via provisions of the national social welfare 
system (table 7.1). The protection of vulnerable customers is especially an important issue in 
some new Member States and the acceding countries.  
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Table 7.1 Obligations to supply 
BE 
 
F W 
CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT1 PL PT3 SI SK FI  SE UK2, 3 
Universal Service 
and the ‘Supplier 
of Last Resort’: 
Operator in 
charge 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
S-
DSO 
Y/ 
DSO4 
Y 
Y/ 
S-
DSO 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
S-
DSO 
Y/ 
S-
DSO 
Under 
preparation 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
S 
N   N 
Y 
Sole 
supplier 
Y/ 
S 
N 
Y 
Under 
preparation 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y  
Y/ 
S-
DSO 
Y 
DSO 
Y/ 
S-
DSO 
General 
obligation to 
supply all 
customers 
Y Y Y N Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y   Y Y (n.a.) 
Y/ 
Only if 
the 
customer 
already 
has a 
supply 
contract 
Y N Y  Y (n.a.) Y 
Solutions offered 
to vulnerable 
customers 
Y/ 
SW 
Y/ 
Pre-
payment 
meter 
N N 
Y/ 
SW 
Y/ 
SW 
n.a. 
Y/ 
SW 
Y/ 
SW 
Y/ 
Pre-
payment 
meter 
N (n.a) N   
Y/ 
SW 
Y 
Y 
Pre-
payment 
meter 
N 
Y 
Pre-
payment 
meter 
Y 
Security 
deposit 
Y 
Pre-
payment 
meter 
 
Y/ 
SW 
Y 
SW 
Y 
Pre-
payment 
meter 
Social tariffs Y Y N N N N N N Y Y Y (n.a) N   N Y N N Y Y N  N N Y 
Procedure in 
case of 
disconnection for 
non payment 
Y Y N 
Y 
Advance-
notice to 
be given 
Y/ 
Advance-
notice to 
be given 
Y 
Advance-
notice to 
be given 
n.a. 
Y 
Advance-
notice to 
be given 
Y Y Y (n.a.) Y   Y N N N Y Y Y  Y  Y 
Compensation to 
the supplier 
Y Y 
Y 
Compen-
sation 
Fund 
Y/ 
«Feed-in 
System» 
Y/ 
Direct 
social 
payment 
Y Y Y Y 
Y 
Compen-
sation 
Fund 
Y Y Y   Y (n.a.) (n.a.) N (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.)  (n.a.)  (n.a.) 
Compensation to 
be recovered by 
network tariffs 
Y Y Y Y (n.a.) Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y   Y (n.a.) (n.a.) Y (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.)  Y  Y 
 
DSO = Distribution System Operator 
S = Supplier 
SW = Social Welfare system 
(n.a.) = not available 
 
Member State characteristics: 
1) In AT, Supplier of Last Resort is assigned to a balance group by regulatory decision. 
2) In the UK, the procedure for the SLR is assigned by the Regulator when needed. 
3) In Portugal this tariff covers about 3500 costumers; in the United Kingdom a social tariff covers approximately 250,000 clients. 
4) Allgemeinversorger. 
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Table 7.1. a) End User Price Control (Households) 
Household customers are protected by systems of ex-ante price control using regulated or fixed tariffs. Ex ante price control should be set at 
realistic levels, taking consumption levels into consideration. Ex-post price control may be required to avoid abuse of a dominant position. 
 
BE  
F W 
CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI  SE UK 
End User Price 
Control 
(Households) 
N/ 
DSO 
tariff 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
Y/R 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
Price cap 
Y/ 
R-F 
Y/ 
R-F 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
  
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
[ex-ante] 
Y/ 
R 
[ex-ante] 
Y/ 
R-F 
Y/ 
R 
(n.a) 
Y/ 
R 
[ex-post] 
N N 
 
 
 
F = Fixed tariff 
R = Regulated tariff 
(n.a.) = not available 
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Environmental protection 
Nearly all member States have introduced public service obligations to foster environmental protection, especially climate change policy. 
Various systems exist to support renewable energy, energy efficiency and CHP. Such obligations are financed via feed-in systems and/or 
network tariffs (table 7.2). Such national public service obligations form part of the Member States strategies to achieve EU objectives on 
renewables or efficiency. 
 
These public service obligations are best placed on suppliers rather than DSOs and should be supported by all parties involved in the electricity 
market in order to avoid distortion of competition. These should be implemented by a general obligation rather than citing individual companies. 
 
Table 7.2. Primary fuel obligation for generation and environmental obligations 
 
BE 
 
F W 
CZ DK1 DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK 
RES Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y (n.a) Y   Y N (n.a.) Y (n.a.) (n.a.) Y  Y Y Y 
CHP (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) Y Y (n.a.) (n.a.) Y Y Y (n.a.) (n.a) Y   (n.a.) N (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) Y  (n.a.) Y Y 
Others, 
Lignite, 
Peat, etc. 
Waste (n.a.) (n.a.) N (n.a.) Lignite Waste 
Y/ 
Waste 
Peat (n.a.) (n.a) 
Y/ 
Waste 
  (n.a.) N (n.a.) N Lignite (n.a.) (n.a.)  N Peat N 
Compensation 
for the 
supplier 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Compen-
sation 
Fund 
Y (n.a) Y   Y N N 
Direct 
support to 
customers 
(n.a.) (n.a.) Y  
Y 
Only 
invest. aid 
Y 
Pay or 
buy out 
Network tariff Y Y Y Y Y (n.a.) Y Y Y Y Y (n.a) Y   Y N N Y (n.a.) (n.a.) Y  Y N Y 
Purchase 
obligation 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y (n.a.) Y Y Y (n.a) Y   Y N N N (n.a.) (n.a.) Y  (n.a.) Y Y 
Energy 
Efficiency 
obligation for 
generation 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y (n.a.) Y Y Y (n.a) Y   Y N N N (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.)  Y (n.a.) Y 
 
RES= Renewable Energy Sources 
CHP = Combined heat and power 
(n.a.) = not available 
 
1) In DK PSOs compensation under “Feed-in system”. 
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Quality of supply 
Most Member States already have a high level of supply quality (Table 7.3). However it is still important to control, maintain and improve the 
standards of service throughout the opening up of the market. Regulatory Authorities need to set appropriate tariffs in line with expected 
performance levels. This is required so as to ensure that network companies maintain the network and guarantee high performance levels. 
 
 
 
Table 7.3 Quality of supply 
 
BE 
 
F W 
CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK 
Obligation to 
respect quality 
performance: 
Operator in 
charge 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
TSO-
DSO 
Y/ 
DSO-
TSO 
Y/ 
DSO-
TSO 
Y/ 
DSO-
TSO 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
S-
DSO 
Y/ 
DSO 
Y/ 
S 
Y/ 
S 
Y/ 
TSO 
  
Y/ 
TSO-
DSO 
N Y N 
Y/ 
Bilateral 
contracts 
Y/ 
TSO-
DSO 
Y/ 
TSO 
 
Y/ 
S-
DSO 
Y/ 
TSO 
Y/ 
TSO-
DSO 
Responsibility 
for technical 
problems 
DSO DSO DSO 
DSO-
TSO 
DSO TSO DSO DSO 
S-
TSO 
S-
TSO 
S TSO TSO   TSO N Y TSO 
S-
TSO 
S-
TSO 
TSO  TSO TSO S 
Penalties for 
end supplier 
N N Y (n.a.) N N (n.a.) Y (n.a.) Y Y (n.a.) Y   Y (n.a.) Y N Y Y (n.a.)  
Price 
reduction 
N Y 
 
DSO=Distributor System Operator  
TSO=Transmission System Operator 
S=Supplier 
(n.a.) = not available 
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Customer Choice  
 
Only by July 2007 all household customers will have the possibility to choose the most attractive electricity and gas suppliers. Information of 
these customer groups is widely differing in Member States and more detailed and informative in those Member States having already achieved 
100% market opening.  
 
Customer switching will only be facilitated if information is provided enabling final customers to compare prices and other services. Electricity 
and gas consumers, in general positively disposed as regards these services of general economic interest, claim to have difficulties obtaining 
adequate information required to make comparisons between different commercial offers (table 7.5). This lack of information virtually excludes 
the possibility of price comparison, a basic feature for any market to function. Improvements on information to allow price comparisons and to 
trigger customer switching are absolutely required. 
 
Similar to what has happened in other sectors, in view of the full opening up of the market, a certain number of operators have already started 
using their website as a means to illustrate their products and services. 
 
Change of supplier should be possible, easy and feasible – subject to reasonable penalty if the contract is broken. Disputes need to be settled 
quickly and fairly to build confidence – outside the courts, if possible. 
 
Transparency of information is normally guaranteed in most Member States by Regulatory Authorities. However, additional national and/or 
Regional Authorities, as well as customer’s organisations are also in charge of objective information. 
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Table 7.4. Customer Choice and Information 
 
 
BE 
 
F W 
CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV3 LT LU HU3 MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI1 SE UK2 
Comparability W P W W W W P P W W P-W 
Sole 
supplier 
P-W   P P P W P (n.a) P  P-W P-W W 
Maximum time 
for pre-notification 
Y 
1 month 
Y 
1 month 
(n.a.) 
Y 
1 month 
(n.a.) 
Y 
30 days 
Y 
3 months 
(n.a.) N N 
Y 
1 month 
(n.a.) (n.a.)   (n.a.) (n.a.) (n.a.) 
Y 
5-8 
weeks 
N (n.a.) (n.a.)  
Y 
2 weeks 
Y 
1 month 
notice 
Y 
1 month 
notice 
Supplier-change 
charge 
N N N N N N 
Contract-
ual 
clause 
N N N N (n.a.) N   N (n.a) 
Contract-
ual 
clause 
N (n.a.) N N  N N N 
Dispute 
settlements 
(Formal 
Procedure) 
Y/ 
O 
Y/ 
RA 
Y 
Y/ 
R 
N 
Y/ 
I 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R 
Y/R 
Y/ 
R 
Y (n.a.) Y   
Y/ 
R 
Y Y 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
R for 
complaints 
in access 
O for others 
Y/ 
R 
Y/ 
O 
 
Y/ 
Client 
complaint 
Board 
and R 
Y 
Y/ 
R 
Response time 
for complaints 
Y/ 
2 weeks 
Y/ 
4 months 
Y/ 
15 days 
(n.a.) N N N N (n.a.) 
Y/ 
10 days 
Y/ 
20 days 
(n.a.) 
Y/ 
15 to 
30 days 
  
Y/ 
15 to 
30 days 
N 
Y 
4 months 
Y/ 
7 weeks 
Y/ 
R 
30 days 
Y/ 
R 
20 days 
O 
15 d 
Y  Y N 
Y/ 
17 weeks 
 
W=Website 
P =Publications and/or advertising campaigns 
O = Operator 
R = Regulator 
RA = Regional Authority 
I = Inspectorate 
(n.a.) = not available 
 
Member state characteristics: 
1) In Finland, the TSO can charge for an extra meter reading if the period from the last change of supplier is less than one year. 
2) EnergyWatch is the gas and electricity consumer representative body in the UK. 
3) In Latvia and Hungary charges to install metering equipment must be considered. 
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Table 7.4 b) Contract duration 
 
BE 
 
F W 
CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK 
Contract 
duration 
(n.a.) (n.a.) LT I I I 
 
(n.a.) 
I I I 
LT-
ST 
(n.a.) LT   
LT-
ST 
Single 
buyer 
I 
LT and 
ST 
ST (n.a.) 
LV 
1 month 
MH, 
VH 
1 year 
S- 
1year 
 
S- 
LT 
(n.a.) 
1 month 
advanced 
notice 
 
I = indefinite 
LT = Long Term 
ST = Short Term 
LV = Low Voltage 
MHVH = Medium, high and very high Voltage 
(n.a.) = not available 
 
 
Customers should be clearly informed about the duration of their contracts (Table 7.4 b). A range of contract structures should be given to 
customers according to their needs, particularly concerning the duration of the contract. Long term contracts should be allowed if requested. 
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Table 7.5 Consumer’s attitude towards electricity and gas supply service 
 
These tables aim to highlight the results of the study "European Consumers and Service of General Interest" which has been financed by DG SANCO. This 
study addressed the customers' perception concerning gas and electricity services in the 25 Member States. 
GAS 
 BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK 
Prices P B P P P P P P P B   P P P N P P P B P B N P P P 
Access P P P P P P P P P P   P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
Information B P P P P P P P P P   P P P P P B B P B P P P P B 
Customer Service P P P P P P P P P P   P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
Quality of service                                                  
Complaints                                                   
Terms & Conditions F   F F F F F F F GF F F F F F F F GF F F F F F F F 
 
ELECTRICITY 
 BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK 
Prices P P P P B N B B P N N P N P N N B B N N B B P N P 
Access P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P P 
Information B P P P N N N P P P N P N P P P N N P N P P N N P 
Customer Service P P P P P B N P P P P P P P P P N N P N P P N N N 
Quality of service             P                   P P   P       P P 
Complaints many          many few           few     many many   few     few few   
Terms & Conditions F     F   N N F F N N   F F     F F   N     F N F 
 
P= Positive; F= Fair; GF= Generally Fair; B= Balanced, between P; N= Negative. 
 
Electricity is considered to be a basic service: “Press the button” and the light comes on. Electricity and gas customers are quite satisfied with the 
service provided. However, in general, consumers feel that they have no control over the services offered and that they have difficulties obtaining 
the information required to make a comparison between different commercial offers. This lack of transparency virtually excludes the possibility 
of price comparison. Most consumers are not aware of the terms and conditions of their contract.  
The main expectation of liberalisation relates to price reductions. The interest of consumers in switching suppliers is more pronounced for 
electricity than for gas. The Public Authorities should retain a substantial supervisory and regulatory capacity predominantly for safety 
considerations.  
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General reasons for price dissatisfaction are linked to a frequent feeling of repeated sizeable price increases, often related to taxes. In most 
Member States, strong feelings of price dissatisfaction are often correlated with lower social status. 
Quality of service is considered to be acceptable. The customers’ perception is that bills are complicated and unclear, that pricing regarding peak 
and off-peak periods is complex and bills are often produced using inaccurate estimated consumption. For these reasons most complaints relate 
to billing. It is likely that customers require further education on this subject. 
There is quite some dissatisfaction with regard to the availability and competence of utility staff to be addressed in case of complaints. This 
dissatisfaction goes along with an increasingly automated customer service.  
Requests have been made for more energy efficiency information and clear labelling of the source of electricity. 
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Table 7.6 Consumer’s attitude towards competition and public service 
ELECTRICITY 
 COMPETITION PUBLIC SERVICE 
BE Fear of loosing "social" rates Continued supply and maintenance in remote areas; 
   "vigilance" with respect to prices 
CZ Dubious of cost reduction - 
DK Attitude generally receptive Continued supply; maintenance in remote areas 
 but reservation among vulnerable customers  
DE Attitude of hope (related to price) Safety 
EE Expectations related to price - 
EL Generally receptive and interested Maintenance in remote areas; 
  "vigilance" with respect to prices 
ES Sceptical regarding price reduction Continued supply 
FR Mixed attitudes/interest in principle Continued supply and maintenance in remote areas;  
  quick intervention 
IE Mixed attitudes/interest in principle Continued supply; quick intervention 
IT Mixed attitudes/interest in principle Continued supply and maintenance in remote areas; 
  "vigilance" with respect to prices 
CY - - 
LV Expectations related to price - 
LT Expectations related to price - 
LU Partly receptive and interested Continued supply 
HU Expectations related to price - 
MT Expectations related to price - 
NL Attitude generally receptive but reservation among  Continued supply; safety; 
 vulnerable customers and price transparency "vigilance" with respect to prices 
AT More sceptical Continued supply; safety & maintenance in remote areas; 
  "vigilance" with respect to prices 
PL Expectations related to price - 
PT Mixed attitudes/interest in principle Continued supply 
SI Expectations related to price - 
SK Expectations related to price - 
FI Attitude generally receptive "Vigilance" with respect to prices 
SE Fairly widespread frustration - 
UK Holds the largest number of consumers having  Maintenance in remote areas; quick intervention; 
 changed supplier "vigilance" with respect to prices 
 Mixed attitudes due to lack of comparability of prices  
 
 EN 53   EN 
GAS 
 COMPETITION PUBLIC SERVICE 
BE Interest due to an expectation of lower prices Positive Attitude 
CZ General interest in possibility of choice Positive Attitude 
DK Interest due to an expectation of lower prices Positive Attitude 
DE Interest in principle Positive Attitude 
EE General interest in possibility of choice Positive Attitude 
EL Interest in principle Positive Attitude 
ES Interest in principle Positive Attitude 
FR Interest in principle Positive Attitude 
IE Interest due to an expectation of lower prices Positive Attitude 
IT Interest due to an expectation of lower prices Positive Attitude 
CY  - - 
LV General interest in possibility of choice Positive Attitude 
LT General interest in possibility of choice Positive Attitude 
LU Interest in principle Positive Attitude 
HU Interest in principle, but fear of price increases Positive Attitude 
MT Expectations relate to price Positive Attitude 
NL Interest due to an expectation of lower prices Would like to connect remote areas 
AT Interest due to an expectation of lower prices Positive Attitude 
PL Theoretical interest Positive Attitude 
PT Interest in principle Positive Attitude 
SI General interest in possibility of choice Positive Attitude 
SK General interest in possibility of choice Positive Attitude 
FI Interest in principle Positive Attitude 
SE Interest in principle Positive Attitude 
UK Consumers who have changed supplier express the  Would like to connect remote areas 
 satisfaction of procuring the same service at a   
 slightly lower price.  
 Complaints about lack of comparability of prices.  
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ANNEX 8 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF THE INTERNAL ENERGY MARKET 
8.1 Background 
The opening of the electricity and gas markets to competition takes place in the context of 
clear commitments by the European Union to achieving reductions in carbon emissions. A 
number of policy initiatives have been introduced with the aim of achieving this objective 
including the renewables and cogeneration Directives and measures to reduce demand for 
energy, for example, in buildings. Meanwhile the Emissions Trading Directive is designed to 
ensure reductions in carbon output in an efficient manner. As well as these measures, many 
Member States also have fiscal incentives aimed at reducing the level of energy consumption. 
Mostly these apply to both electricity and gas.  
8.2 Fiscal Policy 
The fiscal framework for electricity and gas consumption is reviewed in Table 8.1 below. 
This shows some divergence of policy among Member States to this question. Some countries 
such as Denmark, the Netherlands and Germany having heavy taxes on electricity and gas, 
while others such as Portugal have low levels of both VAT and other levies. 
Table 8.1 Environmental Policy Fiscal Framework 
 
 VAT rate  energy tax: 
electricity 
energy tax: 
gas 
Austria 20 * **** 
Belgium 21 * * 
Denmark 25 **** *** 
Finland 22 ** * 
France 19.6/5.5
66
 * * 
Germany 16 *** ** 
Greece 8 none none 
Ireland 13.5 none none 
Italy 10 * *** 
Lux 6 * * 
Neth 19 *** ** 
Portugal 5 none n.a. 
Spain 16 * none 
Sweden 25 *** *** 
UK 17.5/5 * * 
Norway 24 ** n.a. 
Estonia 18 * none 
Latvia 18 none none 
Lithuania 18 * none 
Poland 22 * none 
Czech R 19 none none 
Slovakia 19 none none 
Hungary 25 * * 
Slovenia 20 none none 
Cyprus 0 * n.a. 
Malta 5 none n.a. 
                                                 
66
 Communal and Departmental taxes of up to 12% also apply 
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 VAT rate  energy tax: 
electricity 
energy tax: 
gas 
Candidate Countries 
Romania 19 * * 
Bulgaria 20 none none 
Turkey 18 * n.a. 
source: Regulators’ survey responses 
* average energy tax less than €5/MWh 
** average energy tax between €5-15/MWh 
*** average energy tax above €15/MWh 
**** average energy tax above €50/MWh 
8.3 Electricity from Renewable Sources 
As well as measures aimed at reducing the level of demand, a key objective of the 
Community is an increase in the proportion of electricity generated from renewable sources. 
Table 8.2 Environmental Policy Framework: Electricity generation 
 Net addition to generation 2003 (MW) 
 main RES support mechanism net new 
coal/oil 
net new gas net new 
RES/CHP 
other 
Austria feed in tariff 0 0 +340 0 
Belgium green certs. and fiscal incentives 0 0 +80 0 
Denmark feed in tariff 0 0 +350 0 
Finland fiscal investment subsidies 0 0 +20 +55 
France obligation (tender) -500 -10 +285 0 
Germany feed in tariff 0 0 +2900 0 
Greece feed in tariff plus subsidies +380 0 +110 0 
Ireland obligation (tender) - - - - 
Italy green certificates -350 +1740 +450 +240 
Lux feed in tariff - - - - 
Neth obligation (green certs) +800 0 - 0 
Portugal feed in tariff 0 +392 - 0 
Spain feed in tariff 0 +1600 +1300 +117 
Sweden obligation (green certs) 0 0 +250 + 
UK obligation (green certs) 0 -250 +750 0 
Norway direct grants 0 0 +50 0 
Estonia obligation 0 0 +4 0 
Latvia feed in tariffs 0 0 +10 0 
Lithuania fixed price purchase - - - - 
Poland obligation  0 0 +50 0 
Czech R feed in tariff 0 0 0 +1000 
Slovakia obligation to purchase 0 0 +6 0 
Hungary feed in tariff 0 0 +130 0 
Slovenia feed in tariff 0 0 +4 0 
Cyprus obligation to purchase - - - - 
Malta no information available 
Total 
(approx.) 
 +330 +3450 +7000 +1450 
Candidate Countries 
Romania certificates - - - - 
Bulgaria feed in tariff 0 0 +13 0 
Turkey obligation +1600 +1800 +300 0 
Croatia no information available 
Other Neighbouring Countries 
Albania tax incentives 0 0 +26 0 
source: Regulators’ survey responses 
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Table 8.2 above shows the main approach in each Member State and the results currently 
being achieved in terms of the amount of new generation capacity in 2003 for each fuel type. 
The results are particularly encouraging in this regard, with over 7000MW of new renewable 
and CHP generation having been connected, more than half the overall total. 
8.4 Conclusions 
There is no reason at all why the opening of the electricity market should have any negative 
environmental consequences provided that the framework for producers and consumers is set 
in an appropriate way. The Community is working hard to ensure that this is the case and a 
range of measures have been adopted and are being implemented with this in mind. 
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ANNEX 9 EXTERNAL DIMENSION  
9.1 Switzerland 
In 2002 a draft law providing for ultimately complete opening of the Swiss electricity market, 
following essentially the concepts of the electricity directive, was rejected in a referendum by 
the Swiss population by a narrow majority. Following the Italian black-out in September 
2003, which was caused by an incident on a Swiss transmission line, and a ruling of the Swiss 
Federal Court that third party access to networks has in principle to be granted on the basis of 
Swiss competition law, the government has resumed pursuing the objective of opening the 
market at least for industrial customers. A draft law, providing for market opening for larger 
commercial customers (degree of opening of around 40%), unbundling and a regulatory 
authority, was submitted for consultation to stakeholders in September 2004. The draft law 
also contains rules on cross-border issues, similar to the rules contained in the Regulation on 
cross-border electricity exchanges, notably on congestion management. Given the time 
necessary for the legislative procedure and a possible referendum, first steps of market 
opening can be expected in 2008, in case the law is finally approved. First discussions have 
already taken place with Switzerland on negotiating an agreement on electricty trade between 
the EU and Switzerland, which would become effective when the Swiss market becomes 
actually open. At the same time discussions are ongoing to ensure that, independantly from 
the issue of market opening in Switzerland, non-discriminatory transit through Switzerland is 
ensured, notably with respect to congestion management rules.  
9.2 South East Europe 
The South East Europe Energy Regulatory Process launched by the signature of the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Regional Electricity Market in South East Europe 
(REMSEE) and its Integration into the European Union Internal Electricity Market (the 
Athens Memorandum of 15 November 2002).  
The second Athens Memorandum, signed in 2003, recapitulates the first but updates it to 
include the new EU legislation and includes gas. It maintains all the commitments of the first 
memorandum, with the exception of market opening, includes environmental commitments, 
reciprocity provisions, asks the countries to implement security of supply strategies and asks 
the countries to agree dates for market opening and environmental legislation. It is stronger 
than the EU acquis in that it substantially goes beyond the acquis in pooling sovereignty in 
this strategic sector.
67
 Within the “Athens Process” the following Institutional Structure is in 
place: 
The Ministerial Council, which takes place annually with the participation of the Ministers 
of Energy of the member countries and the Commissioner for Energy and Transport, in order 
to take the strategic decisions and give directions to the Forum or to formally adopt or endorse 
conclusions of the Forum. The Presidency of this Council rotates on a six monthly basis. 
                                                 
67
 It was agreed by Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Albania (Kosovo joined pursuant to UN 
Resolution 1244): in addition, Moldova, Hungary and Slovenia were observers. Greece, Italy and 
Ausrtia are political participants to the process. 
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The Permanent High Level Group, which is composed by representatives of the Ministers 
of Energy of the Member Countries and the Commission. The group shall be convened, when 
necessary, on the initiative of either the Commission or the country holding the Presidency at 
the time, in order to prepare the Ministerial Council and to ensure the follow – up of its 
decisions. The Commission co-chairs this group along with the President in Office. 
The South East Europe Energy Regulation Forum – the Athens Forum. The Forum 
comprises representatives of the Commission, governments, regulators and transmission 
system operators of the countries of Southeast Europe, the Council of European Energy 
Regulators (CEER), the European Transmission System Operators (ETSO), the Union for the 
Co-ordination of Transmission for Electricity (UCTE), representatives of donors, electricity 
producing companies, and consumers. The Forum is co-chaired by the European Commission 
and a representative of the president in office.  
9.3 Mediterranean countries 
In May 2003 the first Declaration of intention was signed concerning the development of an 
integrated electricity market in the Maghreb countries with the view to integrating this market 
in the European electricity market. A Memorandum of Understanding has subsequently been 
signed by the Ministers of the three countries and the Commissioner for Energy on 2 
December 2003. The European Commission provides technical assistance to the creation of 
the integrated Maghreb electricity market and its integration in the EU electricity market. 
For the Mashrek countries a declaration of intention has been signed on 2 December 2003 
concerning Euro Mashrek cooperation in the field of natural gas, which ultimately aims at 
creating a similar legal framework in the Mashrek countries to the framework prevailing in 
the European Union. 
A process of energy cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian authority is equally 
underway focussing on the establishment of a joint energy office, cooperation in the field of 
renewable energy and energy efficiency and the study of common projects in the electricity 
and gas fields. 
9.4 Russia 
Both the EU and Russia pursue the objective of integrating their electricity markets, on the 
basis of the existence of a level playing field in terms of market rules and environmental rules, 
including nuclear safety. Furthermore, the establishment of a reliable physical interconnection 
between both electricity systems is necessary. The issue has been dealt with in the context of 
the EU-Russia energy dialogue. 
With respect to the necessary equivalence of market and environmental standards, a fact 
finding exercise, jointly undertaken with the Russian side and aiming at establishing a report 
describing the existing standards in the EU and Russia, is nearing conclusion. Once the report 
is available, a decision at the political level will have to be made on how to proceed further, as 
agreed at an electricity round table, organised in Moscow on 16 October 2003 in the context 
of the energy dialogue. In this respect the approach adopted for the creation of an electricity 
market in South-East Europe, consisting in a request to the Council by the Commission to 
negotiate a bilateral agreement on electricity trade, could serve as a model.  
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Regarding the issue of an interconnection between the Russian/CIS system and the 
continental European electricity system, operated by UCTE, the Commission has declared on 
a number of occasions that it is prepared to co-finance a comprehensive study looking at this 
issue as a priority study of common European interest under the TEN-energy programme. In 
turn, the Russian electricity company RAO UES has stated its willingness to co-finance this 
project from the Russian side. UCTE submitted a corresponding request for co-funding of the 
study under TEN-E in 2004 and a final decision on this request will be made by the end of 
this year. The study is supposed to be finalised in 2007, at the latest. An earlier completion, 
for instance in 2006, is desirable and possible, provided all partners contribute in an efficient 
manner to it.  
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ANNEX 10  End User Prices Tables and Graphs 
Graph 10.1a Electricity prices to large industrial consumers 1997-2004: 24GWh/year  
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Graph 10.1b Electricity prices to large industrial consumers 2000-2004: 24GWh/year  
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Graph 10.2a Electricity prices to small commercial consumers 1997-2004: 50MWh/year  
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Graph 10.2b Electricity prices to small commercial consumers 1997-2004: 50MWh/year 
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Graph 10.3a Electricity prices to household consumers 1997-2004: 3.5MWh/year  
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Graph 10.3b Electricity prices to household consumers 2000-2004: 3.5MWh/year 
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Table 10.1 Eurostat Electricity Retail Prices (Current Prices, Before Taxes) 
 
Prices in the tables and graphs above exclude VAT and other energy taxes. 
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Graph 10.4a Gas prices large commercial consumers 1997-2004: 420 TJ/year (approx. 
120GWh)  
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Graph 10.4b Gas prices large commercial consumers 1997-2004: 420 000GJ/year 
(approx. 120GWh)  
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Graph 10.5a Gas prices small commercial consumers 1997-2004: 420GJ/year (approx. 
120MWh)  
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Graph 10.5b Gas prices small commercial consumers 1997-2004: 420GJ/year (approx. 
120MWh)  
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Graph 10.6a Gas Prices to household consumers 1997-2004: 16GJ/year (approx. 
4.5MWh) 
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Graph 10.6b Gas Prices to household consumers 1997-2004: 16GJ/year (approx. 
4.5MWh) 
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Table 10.2 Eurostat Gas Retail Prices (Current Prices, Before Taxes) 
 
Prices in the tables and graphs above exclude VAT and other energy taxes. 
